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I. INTRODUCTION

A.

Looking at Judicial Conscience

Justice Holmes, an icon of both the theory and the practice of
the appellate judicial role, once famously said that the job of the
judge is not to "do justice" but simply to apply the law.' Along
similar lines, law professors are forever reminding our students
that when referring to judicial opinions, they ought to say that
courts "hold" or "state" or "reason," but not that they "feel" or "believe." But, of course, judges are human, so we know that they do
feel and believe things. They have convictions and commitments
that are important to them, both personally and in their official
capacities, both on and off the bench. While it is not commonplace, one does find statements of commitment to judicial conscience in judicial opinions. The research for this article, which
focuses on the opinions of federal appellate judges, has yielded
many examples of courts or individual judges who do feel compelled to "do justice" with reference to their conscientious commitments. They express openly and often act on these conscientious commitments, both professional and personal, in the decision-making process, whether or not the "just"outcome is actually
available to them as a matter of law. This means that at times, as
a matter of conscience, judges do speak out in official written opin1. See Michael Herz, Do Justice! Variationsof a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111
(1996) (recounting the uncertainty and debate over the second half of this famous saying);
see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF

JUDICIAL DECISION 38 (2008) (quoting a different version of the anecdote, citing Learned
Hand, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 306-07 (1960)).
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ions against the apparently straightforward application of established law. As might be expected, there are also opinions in which
judges speak out specifically against such expressions of conscience, either as a matter of explaining what restrains that judge
from saying more, or as a matter of questioning the propriety of a
competing opinion in the same case. In practice, there is little
clarity, and certainly less than perfect consensus, about this aspect of the appellate judicial role.
This article explores the propriety of the use of federal appellate
opinions-especially concurring and dissenting opinions-as platforms for explicit statements of conscience. The discussion here is
less about the use of those conscientious commitments in reaching
a decision, and more about what judges actually say about their
own conscience in their opinions, and where and how they say it.
It assesses normative questions about whether these expressions
are generally a good or a bad thing in the larger context of the judicial role. Judicial writings are, after all, called "opinions," but
there are substantial questions about whether these opinions are
supposed to include anything more or other than strict legal interpretation. This article explores the contexts and ends of expression of judicial conscience in order to determine the limits of its
legitimacy. The article does not catalog the psychological or sociological literature on conscience. Nor does it attempt to define conscience as distinct from any other kind of moral commitment.2
Instead it will be limited to an exploration of what judges themselves actually say on the record in their official opinions that indicates some resort to what those judges themselves refer to specifically as their "conscience."
B.

Lack of Consensus or Clarity

The lack of clarity, in both theory and practice, as to where these expressions of conscience belong (if anywhere), and what they
may or should include, is revealed in the lack of a consistent practice and in the varying reactions of individual judges to the choices
made by their colleagues. One example of a hesitant uncertainty
about what the judicial conscience is, and how it ought to be used
in the decision-making process, appears in an old case from the
2. There are other discussions of attempts to differentiate between conscience, reliSee, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF
gious beliefs, morality, and so on.
CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS*EQUALITY (2008); Kent

Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901 (2010).
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Seventh Circuit. Judge Grosscup, in a dissenting opinion in a case
about gambling, wrote:
Gambling and gambling devices are condemned by the laws of
every state and territory, except perhaps New Mexico. Upon
this it can be safely predicated that the conscience of the peo-

ple of the state in which this court sits; of the people of the
three states that constitute this circuit; indeed, of the people
of every state and territory, except a little territory bordering
on Mexico, condemns the practice of gambling. Gambling and
gambling devices are condemned, also, by the enactments of
congress, in the statutes forbidding the use of the mails in aid
of lotteries and other gambling purposes. Thus the national
conscience is seen to be outspoken against the practice. Nothing could be conceived more conclusively showing a general
conscience, and a general conception of policy. Unless a moral
sense, thus widespread and unanimous, may be accepted as
the conscience, not simply of the chancellor, but the judicial
conscience, I am at a loss to know where to look for any authority for judicialconscience.3

Despite the rhetorical uncertainty of Judge Grosscup's position
here, his position may be contrasted with the more recently stated
view of Judge Gould of the Ninth Circuit, who wrote as follows: "I
pen this dissent to explain my views, because a dissent is a matter
of individual judicial statement and individual judicial conscience."4 Notably, neither of these judges made an effort to provide any authority for their understanding of, or authority to
make reference to, "judicial conscience." In this, they are by no
means alone. There is great variety in the apparent meaning and
scope given to the idea of judicial conscience as expressed in judicial opinions, and very little, if any, support offered for any of
those positions. Thus, only an examination of the practical usage
of the term can hope to yield a better understanding of the legitimacy of these expressions.'

3. Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 279-80 n.1 (7th Cir. 1903) (Grosscup, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
4. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1038 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (Gould, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
5. See Kent Greenawalt, The Perceived Authority of Law in Judging Constitutional
Cases, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 783, 786 (1990) (making similar commentary on the need to look
at actual practice to understand judicial conduct).
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As to more specific questions of placement, there is a similar
lack of clarity and consistency. Indeed, one may find cases in
which the three judges on a single panel agree about an underlying substantive point of right or wrong, justice or injustice, but
apparently disagree about the propriety of whether to mention
their conscientious concerns and about where to make that mention. They may make their points in separate opinions and give
differing kinds and degrees of explanation for the approaches they
have taken.' For instance, a majority might apply the law as it
stands, but as a matter of conscience note its harshness; a concurrence in the same matter might particularly note the fact of binding precedent in the face of both personal and institutional conscientious objections; and a dissent might state without further explanation a level of conscientious discomfort rising to an inability
to follow the established law.' This last approach is perhaps most
clearly an abdication of the judicial obligation to apply the law,
but the fact that it happens at all demonstrates some practical
need for such an opportunity for expression on the part of those
who occupy the judicial role.
This is also a topic on which many judges have spoken in their
off-the-bench capacities, in speeches or essays intended either for
those in the legal academy or for the general public. In those offthe-bench contexts, judges are all over the map in their assessments of what is appropriate to the judicial role, and why, on what
course of action is appropriate, and which are the proper motivations for the judge.' They are in substantial agreement, however,
about the fact that these are not purely academic questions, but
rather, real and painful dilemmas they must face in the fulfillment of their basic role obligations.
C.

Limiting the Field

The field for this paper is limited to opinions written by intermediate federal appellate judges. In addition to simply narrowing
the field to a more manageable number of opinions, this limitation
6. See, e.g., Rico v. Terhune, 63 F. App'x 394 (9th Cir. 2003); Wallace v. Castro, 65 F.
App'x 618 (9th Cir. 2003); Turner v. Candelaria, 64 F. App'x 647 (9th Cir. 2003).
7. See, e.g., Rico, 63 F. App'x at 394; Wallace, 65 F. App'x at 618; Turner, 64 F. App'x
at 647.
8. In the absence of clear law or openly established norms of practice, these tend to be
very individualized notions. Informally, for example, one federal appellate judge of long
experience once explained to me that one dissents only "when one's indignation outstrips
one's inertia."
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eliminates a variety of complications. First, by eliminating the
state-court-specific issue of the potential impact of the opinions on
retention by re-election or reappointment, it considers only the
work of those who have the comparative security of life tenure,
which might factor into judicial decisions about what to express in
written opinions. In this way, any (to my mind improper) representative notions of the judicial role and accountability in that
role, are largely eliminated.?
Second, it excludes the opinions of courts of last resort, which
have more commonly been the focus of attention in discussions of
the proper uses of concurrences and dissents."o The current Model
Code of Judicial Conduct does not speak to the issue of concurring
or dissenting as presenting any questions, ethical or otherwise,1
but the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics did have one paragraph on the subject. Former Canon 19 (on Judicial Opinions)
said, in pertinent part:
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last
resort should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusions and the consequent influence of judicial decision. A judge should not yield to pride of opinion or value
more highly his individual reputation than that of the court to
which he should be loyal. Except in case of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opin-

ions should be discouraged in courts of last resort.12
There is no such special consideration of separate opinions at the
intermediate appellate level, though of course the second sentence
of the passage may be applied with equal meaning for courts of all
9. To my mind, such representative notions of the judicial role are entirely improper.
Cf Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803-06 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10. In 1952, the American Bar Association sponsored an essay contest on the subject of
"The Functions of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last Resort," which
prompted several contributions on the subject. See, e.g., R. Dean Moorhead, The 1952 Ross
Prize Essay: Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 A.B.A. J. 821 (1952) (winner of the
competition); Richard B. Stephens, The Functionof Concurringand Dissenting Opinions in
Courts of Last Resort, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 394 (1952) (another entry). Several others, in addressing the issue of special opinions, have focused on issues specific to courts of last resort.
See, e.g., Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 163, 180-83 (2002) (articulating differences between collaborative and oppositional
dissents at the United States Supreme Court); Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The
Heated JudicialDissent, 39 A.B.A. J. 794 (1953) (mainly written to criticize one California
Supreme Court justice's dissents).
11. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2011).
12. CANONS OF JUD. ETmcs Canon 12 (1924) (emphasis added).
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levels. Despite the lack of official attention or instruction, at least
one of the rationales supporting the worth of concurring and dissenting opinions-that is, signaling to a higher court an argument
for a change in the law-is irrelevant to a court of last resort. But
more importantly, thinking in terms of differentiated understandings of the judicial role at different levels, a court of last resortparticularly the United States Supreme Court-may be more
readily accepted as one that more naturally has to make more ultimate political or value judgments. 13 Thus, the central question
of this paper might be answered differently in the context of courts
of last resort.1 4
Third, by taking district court judges out of the analysis, the article contemplates collegial judging in which there is more obviously room for one judge to disagree with colleagues on a panel
without practical disruption of the status quo in the law. Fourth,
it significantly limits the number of questions of fact, as opposed
to questions of law. The questions of fact remain to some extent in
the appellate review of findings of sufficiency of evidence, harmful
error, and abuse of discretion, and these are situations that do
tend to provoke personal views in appellate opinions. Again, the
sheer number of these issues is reduced at the appellate level, and
the focus is thus more clearly on developing and clarifying the law
and its practical application with regard to these fact questions, as
opposed to the broader ranging task of actually making the basic
factual findings at the district court level.
Ultimately, this limitation to the opinions of federal appellate
courts presents the question in its most distilled form, considering
the perspective of non-elected, life-tenured, and (at least theoretically) non-last-resort judges," who deal primarily in questions of
law rather than fact. Moving from conclusions about expressions
of conscience in this limited context, one might then be able to go
13.

See, e.g., CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL

ELECTIONS 11 (2009); James L. Gibson, The Effects of Electoral Campaigns on the Legitimacy of Courts, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 397, 413 (2009) (referring to courts of last resort as
"policy makers").
14. This is not to say, of course, that many of the arguments presented in the paper
might not be relevant as well to courts of last resort, but for purposes of a purer focus, the
issues peculiar to courts of last resort are eliminated here.
15. Due to the very small number of cases taken by the United States Supreme Court,
there are ways in which intermediate appellate courts in the federal system are de facto
courts of last resort, but the cases that may be most likely to call for separate opinions may
at the same time be those most likely to have a chance at being further reviewed. Therefore, the de facto reality does not end the inquiry into the particularities of intermediate
appellate role.
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further with regard to assessment of the propriety of the practice
by judges in other courts. This article thus only tackles a small
piece of the bigger question about the extent to which judges are
meant to consider or use their own views or consciences in their
judicial decision-making, or how they might operate without them
wherever practical judgment is required. The answers to these
questions will of course have implications for their fit into a
broader theoretical and practical theorization about the fulfillment of the core commitments essential to the integrity of the judicial role.
D.

Background Theory of the JudicialRole

The understanding of the judicial role that lies at the heart of
this paper is one of institutional trusteeship of judges. In this
model, judges act as trustees of the corpus of the common law,
maintaining its integrity through fidelity to past decisions and
continuing consideration of fit and consistency between and
among various areas of the law as they develop." Intermediate
appellate judges, as trustees of the law, are accountable to the
public for their management of the corpus and provide this accountability primarily through the body of their opinions. These
judges are in a position to develop and maintain a special perspective on the law, one that is both practical and theoretical, both
specific and overarching, both immediate and long term.
Furthermore, along with all of the many legal decisions judges
must make in the execution of their responsibilities, they must
always be making decisions about allocation of court resources.
Trusteeship implicates a broad array of institutional responsibili16. Though compliance with the law is arguably the most basic aspect of common law
judicial decision-making, see, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2011), even on
this point, some disagree. Jerome Frank, for instance, argued that there was no hard and
fast obligation to follow the law, but wrote instead: "But the power to individualize and to
legislate judicially is of the very essence of their function. To treat judicial free adaptation
and law-making as if they were bootlegging operations, renders the product unnecessarily
impure and harmful." JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 121 (1930).

Pointing

especially to what he called the "leeways of precedent," Karl Llewellyn advocated a quite
flexible view of appellate judicial interpretation as a matter of craft and "situation-sense."
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 62 (1960).

A

rather more recent view defending outright judicial deviation from the law suggests that at
times, judges "have the moral right, and moral reasons, to disregard clear legal mandates,
and not only when the law is extremely unjust." JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF
LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF LAWLESS JUDGING 13 (2010). Professor Brand-Ballard does not

direct specific attention to the particular question of judicial "conscience" as that term is
used by judges themselves, so does not reach the precise issue addressed in this article.

Winter 2013

In Good Conscience

103

ties-core commitments such as fidelity to legal (especially constitutional) authority, impartiality, independence, accountability,
and practical wisdom-to which judges must be committed."
They must have good judgment about these matters of resources
just as they do in their application of the law. Such good judgment and practical wisdom is, for many if not all judges, and
whether they mention it or not, likely a matter of conscience at
some level.
II. LAW AND CONSCIENCE

A.

Consonanceand Dissonance

Law and conscience will of course often be perfectly consonant."1
Most of the time, this should be fairly unremarkable, and thus it
will not be mentioned in the mine run of opinions. In those situations where no judge on the panel disagrees on any material matter in the case, so that only a majority opinion will be published,
there is often little to be gained by adding considerations of conscience or morality to support what is already established law."9
It does happen, though, most commonly in instances in which the
opinion underscores the judicial obligation of faithful adherence to
precedent as a matter of institutional conscience.20 Other common
circumstances for references to conscience as further support for
an otherwise already legally tenable position include matters implicating issues of judicial resources and burdens on the courts 2 1
other players in the justice system,22 issues of substantive or procedural fairness,2 3 and others still.2 4
17. These commitments lead one scholar to refer to judges as the "most constrained" of
officials when it comes to the bases for their decisions. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious
Liberty and DemocraticPolitics,23 N. KY. L. REV. 629, 637 (1996).
18. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (1964); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
19. Some would not even support the expression of personal reasons to bolster legal
determinations. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 17, at 637.
20. See, e.g., Carnival Leisure Indus. v. Aubin, 53 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1995); Prudential Ins. Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 991 F.2d 1080, 1088 (3d Cir. 1993); 111. Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1985). The term "institutional conscience" is
further elaborated infra Sections II.D and III.
21. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1991) (expressing concern about condoning litigation that is unmeritorious); Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d
1329, 1347 (5th Cir. 1989) (expressing concern about allowing litigation to go on with no
definite end point).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Corona, 661 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1981) (Sneed, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that it is a difficult case and that the majority's position is
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Such positions do not only appear in unanimous majority opinions, but also in dissents in those cases in which at least one judge
believes that he or she is correct both on the law and on the morality, but is compelled to write in a dissenting opinion due to a difference of legal interpretation between the dissenter and others on
the court.2 5 It is the expressions of the consonance of law and conscience that appear in the concurring and dissenting opinions,
though, that turn out to be more worthy of note for the purposes of
this discussion. Where the consonance appears in a majority opinion, it simply has that much less force or weight, in the light of the
clarity of the established law. However, this article does not limit
its discussion to cases in which conscience differs from law. Any
resort or reference to conscience is ripe for discussion in the effort
to develop a fuller and clearer understanding of what judicial conscience is and how it fits into the shape of the judicial role.26
While the propriety of judicial reference to conscience in further
support of an uncontroverted legal interpretation is perhaps an
defensible, but noting that he cannot "in good conscience" ask police officers to subject
themselves to the risks that the majority's rule would create for them).
23. See, e.g., Morelite Constr. Co. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984);
Hatch v. FERC, 654 F.2d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 1981); THI-Hawaii, Inc. v. First Commerce Fin.
Corp., 627 F.2d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 1980)
24. See, e.g., Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding an appeal of denial of habeas petition in a multiple murder case with both life and death sentences on grounds relating to adequacy of counsel and noting that the court "simply cannot
in good conscience continue to send men to their deaths without ensuring that their cases
were not prejudiced. . . .") (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1997) (Selya, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the majority's result condones an unconstitutional and intolerable result, which he cannot "in good conscience join"). The Joyce case drew two other concurrences as well, one of which was sympathetic to the dissenting position, but found the
very fact of strong disagreement of the judges to be evidence that the law was not clear
enough to show conclusively that the actions in question were objectively unreasonable. Id.
at 24 (Lynch, J., concurring). The other concurrence took issue with the dissent for having
lost sight of the reasonableness standard. Id. at 23-24 (Torruella, J., concurring); see also
Ferguson v. Knight, 809 F.2d 1239, 1247 (6th Cir. 2007) (Jones, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the court can only rely on evidence properly before it: "I cannot in good conscience or
consistent with my oath, agree to affirm the judgment below. Justice is being mocked
here."); Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem'l Hosp., 701 F.2d 1266, 1269 (8th Cir. 1983) (Lay,
J., dissenting).
26. It is only the judicial references to the conscience of the court or of the individual
judge that are covered here. References to the conscientious responsibilities or the conscientious beliefs of others-whether made in passing or in the application of legal standards
implicating the language of conscience-are thus left out of the discussion. So, for example,
Judge McKee, of the Third Circuit, noted the "human cost" and the "unconscionable delay"
attributable to the government in the long term process of a particular immigration case,
but he was not talking about the good conscience of the court, but rather about the conscientious responsibility of the government. See Alvarado v. Attorney. Gen. of U.S., 401 F.
App'x. 673, 675-76 (3d Cir. 2010) (McKee, J., concurring).
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interesting academic question, the more difficult question is what
ought to happen when a judge's considerations of conscience are in
conflict with established law, or at any rate with the interpretation of the law accepted by a majority of the relevant panel. Any
judge who feels faced with a serious dissonance between law and
conscience has an array of options at least apparently open to him.
To state them roughly and in relatively short order, a judge could:
(1) keep silent about the conflict and simply follow the law;2 7 (2)
follow the law, but state the conflict (whether in majority, concurrence, and/or dissent);28 (3) comply with the law and keep silent
about the conflict from the bench, but work off the bench on law
reform efforts in the area of concern;2 9 (4) find a way (whether
honest or disingenuous) to get to the conscientious-but-not-legal
result without mentioning the conflict; 30 (5) state the conflict and
follow conscience rather than law (again, whether in majority,
concurrence, and/or dissent);3 ' (6) dissent without giving a reason; 32 (7) recuse from the case;" or (8) resign from the bench.3 4
How a judge ought to make the decision about which option to
choose from this full array is a broader question for a separate
article. This article is limited, as far as possible, to the question of
the proper uses of separate opinions for the expression of personal
convictions by judges of the federal appellate courts.

27. By their very nature, such cases cannot be found for citation.
28. See discussion infra Section III.
29. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 4, R. 3.1 cmts. 1 and 2, R. 3.2
cmt. 1 (2011).
30. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 17, at 637.
31. See, e.g., Rico v. Terhune, 63 F. App'x. 394, 394 (9th Cir. 2003); Wallace v. Castro,
65 F.App'x. 618, 619 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J., dissenting); Turner v. Candelaria, 64
F.App'x. 647, 648 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J., dissenting); Trailer Train Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 929 F.2d 1300, 1304 (8th Cir. 1991) (Gibson, J., dissenting) ("I do not fault the
majority for following the precedents of this and other courts of appeal, but I simply cannot
in good conscience participate in the judicial extension of legislation to an absurd end.").
32. These "silent" dissents are a subject of some debate. Arguments can be found on
both sides. Compare, e.g., Francis P. O'Connor, The Art of Collegiality: CreatingConsensus
and Coping with Dissent, 83 MASS. L. REV. 93, 93 (1998) (asserting that it is essential to
give reasoning for a dissent), with Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of
State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 218 (1957) (suggesting that in some instances it is best for the judge to "record his dissent in two words").
33. Like the cases in which judges remain silent as to the conflict or the issue of conscience, because judges typically do not give their reasons for recusing in written form, such
cases cannot be provided for citation.
34. See, e.g., Gene E. Franchini, Conscience, Judging,and Conscientious Judging,2 J.
App. PRAC. & PROCESS 19, 19-21 (2000) (recounting resignation in face of what he saw as a
conflict between his oath of office and his conscience).
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"Conscience"in Judges' Own Terms

When judges use words and phrases like "in good conscience" or
"unconscionable," they do so in many contexts and with a broad
range of ideas apparently in mind.35 Though some scholarship in
this area tends to be focused specifically on the role or expression
of a judge's religious faith,36 it can be hard to distinguish-and it
is probably pointless to try to divine any distinction, for purposes
of this paper-between religiously based convictions and any other
personal commitments that underlie actual judicial usage of the
word "conscience."" It is difficult to pin down a particular consensus definition of conscience or the unconscionable, either in the
actual usage by judges or in the legal academic literature that has
built up around this concept. Much might be included, but some
usages are clearly of more import than others for this topic.
Black's Law Dictionary defines conscience as "1. The moral sense
of right or wrong; esp., a moral sense applied to one's own judgment and actions. 2. In law, the moral rule that requires justice
and honest dealings between people."38 This underscores the over35. Sometimes the phrases are used when there is no obvious matter of conscience
independent from the proper interpretation and application of the law. See, e.g., Harris v.
Sentry Title Co., Inc., 715 F.2d 941, 961 (5th Cir.) (Will, J., dissenting), (dissenting again,
after a rehearing before the same panel, but making no further specific reference to conscience), mandate recalled by, 727 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1984); Clephas v. Fagelson,
Shonberger, Payne & Arthur, 719 F.2d 92, 95 (4th Cir. 1983) (Hall, J., concurring) (stating
the disagreement as a matter of conscience and arguing that the majority got the law
wrong and did so by "cavalierly disregard[ing]" precedent). Along similar lines, the concurrence/dissent in United States v. Holmes uses language about conscience and "'miscarriage
of justice,'" but does so in the context of what looks like an argument about the validity of
the majority's interpretation of precedent. The opinion uses conscience on both sides, talking both about "conscientious" deference to precedent and about a potential miscarriage of
justice in following that precedent as interpreted. 822 F.2d 481, 506 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. See, e.g., Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial DecisionMaking, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 513 (1998); Ori Lev, Personal Morality and Judicial DecisionMaking in the Death Penalty Context, 11 J. L. & RELIG. 637 (1995); Diarmuid O'Scannlain,
Must a Faithful Judge be a FaithlessJudge?, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 157 (2006); William H.
Pryor, Jr., The Religious Faith and JudicialDuty of an American Catholic Judge, 24 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 347 (2006); William H. Pryor, Jr., ChristianDuty and the Rule of Law, 34
CUMB. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003).
37. Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 909-16.
38. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 345 (9th ed. 2009). Further definitions of terms such as
"conscience of the court" and "shocks the conscience" reiterate concepts of "fairness" and
"justice" as the basis for conscience. "Conscionable" is defined as "conforming with good
conscience; just and reasonable." Id. "Shock the conscience" goes somewhat further, in its
meaning: "to cause intense ethical or humanitarian discomfort." Id. at 1504.
"Unconscionability" is defined as "extreme unfairness," and "unconscionable" is defined as
"(of a person) having no conscience; unscrupulous" and as "(of an act or transaction) show-
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lap, and thus the lack of specific distinction, among the terms
"conscience," "morality," and "justice.""
These terms must, to a certain extent, be left a bit muddy, because one must take them as the courts use them. Judges are not
necessarily philosophers or linguists, and they are not typically
concerned with precision about distinctions among these particular terms.4 0 Furthermore, to get too technical about the verbal or
semantic distinctions here might even encourage an unwarranted
and unhelpful formalism by judges. Examination of the variety of
uses of these terms by judges does, however, reveal some broad
categories of apparent meaning. Sometimes it is a matter of a
judge's core personal conviction about right and wrong; sometimes
it is a matter of responsibility for the integrity of the institution
(for the proper role of the court, for its reputation, or for proper
use of its resources, for example);4 1 sometimes it is an attempt to
speak for something like a "common conscience" or a common public notion of justice or other values;42 and sometimes it is simply a
matter of personal honesty about a particular view of the facts or
the law in a given case.4 3
ing no regard for conscience; affronting the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness."
Id. at 1663-64.
39. Acknowledging that definitions of conscience may vary according to context, Professor Greenawalt has suggested that matters of conscience are those that involve "judgments
believed by those making them to be of considerable moral importance." Greenawalt, supra
note 2, at 901, 903-04. Martha Nussbaum somewhat more broadly suggests that conscience
is a matter of the "search for life's ultimate meaning." NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 19.
Professor Powell, writing about conscience in Supreme Court decisions in Constitutional
cases, speaks of making decisions "in good faith" and "according to the rules." POWELL,
supra note 1, passim.
40. Judge Merritt, for example, at one point roughly equates the idea of "judicial conscience" with "equity," but the terms of that equation are themselves quite flexible and
open. United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
41. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wood (Campbell 1), 18 F.3d 662, 717 (9th Cir.) (en banc)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the majority opinion is inconsistent with dignity of man and will harm the reputation of the court), reh'g
denied, 20 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994); Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 214 (2d Cir.
1991) (Altimari, J., dissenting) (noting that he "cannot in good conscience sit idly by and
allow the Due Process clause to become mere words"). A historical perspective adds the
idea of a meaning of honesty with special reference to judicial knowledge of facts not otherwise admissible/provable. See Mike Macnair, Equity and Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 659 (2007).
42. See, e.g., Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 280 (7th Cir. 1903) (Grosscup, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Silva-Arzeta, 602 F.3d 1208, 1220 (10th Cir. 2010) (Holloway, J., dissenting) (stating that though he cannot find fault with the majority opinion,
he nonetheless cannot sign on to an opinion that affirms such troubling accumulations of
police errors); Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 548 (6th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J., dissenting);
Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603, 616 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cyr, J., dissenting)
(citing "fundamental disagreement" with treatment of this case under Supreme Court prec-
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Very often, phrases like "in good conscience" or "unconscionable," or other variants on these, come up in cases having to do in
one way or another with liberty interests, and of those, very often
the cases are before the court on appeals of denials of habeas petitions." These are decisions in which a panel's collective decision
may effectively be the end of the road on life and death issues.
Another common context for these expressions of conscience is in
dissents from denials of petitions for rehearing en banc-again, an
end of the road determination, which may introduce frustration
about the full court not taking up a matter a judge believes to be a
moral imperative for further attention." Although judges certainly do use other related terms such as "morality," "injustice", and
"unfairness" as well in these kinds of scenarios, this article limits
the discussion to those specifically using "conscience" and its cognates, in an attempt to get a clearer picture of what judges themselves see as the proper role for their conscientious commitments
in their decision-making and what that may reveal to help us better understand the larger shape of the judicial role."
edent). In this last case, a concurrence called it a close case under precedent, noted the
muddled nature of Supreme Court precedent, and noted that only the binding nature of
that precedent permitted him to sign onto the opinion "in good conscience." Morehead, 97
F.3d at 616 (Selya, J., concurring).
44. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wood (Campbell II), 20 F.3d at 1051-54 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Campbell 1, 18 F.3d at 717 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1540 (9th Cir. 1990);
Ferguson v. Knight, 809 F.2d 1239, 1247 (6th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting).
45. See discussion infra Section III(G).
46. Though this paper is limited to judicial references to "conscience" in particular,
similar themes emerge in cases using other terms. Therefore, the observations here may be
more broadly true of judicial use of other terms as well. For example, without referencing
'conscience" specifically, Judge Hill wrote in a dissenting opinion about the responsibility
to follow the law even where the judge's own view may differ-a point similar to what will
be discussed below on matters of separation of powers:
As I have previously asserted, the adage "Hard cases make bad law" ought to be taken as a warning and not as a mandate. In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 542 F.2d
297, 298 (5th Cir. 1976) (Hill, J., dissenting), rev'd, 430 U.S. 723, 97 S. Ct. 1439, 52
L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). This is a hard case. The court, today, makes bad law. Though
tempted, I cannot join. The court faces a "hard" case "whenever the judge of the court
has the power to order that which he believes to be right and, yet, he does not have
the authority to issue the order." Id. This case qualifies as a "hard" case. The district
court found that McGinnis "suffered many more racial indignities at the hands of the
Company than any one citizen should be called upon to bear in a lifetime." . . . Although we yearn for McGinnis to be compensated for those indignities and though the
federal courts have power to order compensation, I submit that we unfortunately may
not have the authority to do so.
McGinnis v. Ingram Equip. Co., Inc. 918 F.2d 1491, 1498 (Hill, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Along similar lines, Judge Bork dissented, speaking to the temptation judges face
with regard to doing justice, again without specific reference to conscience, but illuminating
similar themes:
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Some instances of these words and phrases relating to conscience should be bracketed off from the central inquiry heremost notably those in which the word or phrase is itself a part of a
legal standard being applied. So, for example: "unconscionable"
where it is used as a standard in the substantive law of contract;4 7
"in equity and good conscience" where it is used as a substantive
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) with reference to joinder;"8 and "shocks the conscience" with regard to judicial review of damages awards.49 In these instances (among others), because judges are explicitly employing the terms themselves
as legal standards, the words come with more established meanings in case law; they are terms of art with definitions already
built up in the law. Thus in these instances, there is less, if indeed any, idea of potential dissonance between law and conscience
on the part of the individual judge. The deployment of the legal
standard may require some application of the individual judge's
own conscientious commitment, but that standard, in which conscience is explicitly called for, will be imbued with and guided by
the implications of past decisions under the standard. In these
situations, there is no controversy or conflict over the propriety of
the expression of what might be thought of as a personal view of
This case illustrates the costs to the legal system when compassion displaces law.
The panel majority says it is not too late for justice to be done. But we administer
justice according to law. Justice in a larger sense, justice according to morality, is for
Congress and the President to administer, if they see fit, through the creation of new
law. The wartime internment around which this case revolves is undeniably a very
troublesome part of our history. It is within the authority of the political branches to
make whatever reparations they deem appropriate, and it is my understanding that
such legislation is presently under consideration. The issue of whether an additional
remedy is available from a court, and, if so, which court, should only be resolved on
the basis of a sober and fair assessment of the legal claims presented. When a court
relies instead on a plainly deficient analysis, it fails to do justice to the parties before
it, and inevitably establishes those deficiencies as precedent. The temptation to do so,
in service of an attractive outcome, is often strong. The panel opinion in this case,
which completely disrupts a carefully crafted jurisdictional scheme while establishing
several unfounded and undesirable precedents as law, demonstrates why such temptations ought to be resisted.
Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting). The emphasis here on "costs to the legal system" and "a carefully crafted jurisdictional scheme"
underscores the institutional or public perspective, as opposed to the personal, and sets up
a direct contrast between that perspective ("law") and "compassion," which it sets up as a
temptation to incorporate the more personal. The explanation given here regarding context
does not shy away from resorting to common sense, but still notes the impropriety of succumbing to the temptations to do justice apart from the law.
47. U.C.C § 2-302 (2011).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
49.

See 11 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE

§ 2815,

at 162 n.7 (2d ed. 1995).
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conscience, because here the personal view has been, to a limited
extent, expressly imported into the legal analysis. In short, the
law itself calls for the judge's consideration of conscience. These
are situations in which the law explicitly calls for the application
of the "practical wisdom" of the judge. This article for the most
part leaves aside discussion of these situations in order to focus on
those in which the judge decides, independent of any explicit legal
permission or requirement, to express a view as to conscience.
Some federal appellate judges seem more inclined than others to
give open, written expression to their appeals to conscience in
their decision-making."o However, it is hard to say for certain why
this might be so. No particularly reliable patterns emerge, in
looking at the work of any given judge, as to justification, placement, or any other aspect of the expression. The best one can do is
assess the broad sweep of the circumstances in which these expressions of conscience appear across the board, looking at the
content, the tone, the contextual placement in majorities, concurrences, or dissents, and try to get a picture of what judges on these
particular courts are doing. Whatever one may gather from that
effort may then provide a jumping-off point for assessment of the
propriety of these expressions as an aspect of the judicial role
more broadly, including such diverse circumstances as other
types of courts having different roles and different selection and
retention methods.
C.

The Special Problem of Discretion

A murky and therefore problematic area for this question is that
of review of discretionary decisions, where a real lack of clarity or
consensus about the bounds on proper inputs or the forthrightness
of explanation clouds the field of appellate review."' The appellate
standard of "abuse of discretion," if it is to mean something distinct from clear legal error, must, to a certain extent, be in the eye
of the beholder-a matter of individual judgment.52 Where discre50. On the Ninth Circuit, Judges Pregerson and Reinhardt easily top the list. Following behind them are, on the First Circuit, Judge Selya; on the Second Circuit, Judge Feinberg; on the Sixth Circuit, Judge Keith; and on the Eighth Circuit, Judge Lay.
51. See Sarah M. R. Cravens, JudgingDiscretion: Contexts for Understandingthe Role
of Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947 (2010).
52. Black's Law Dictionary defines "discretion" variously as "1. Wise conduct and management; cautious discernment; prudence. 2. Individual judgment; the power of free decision-making ....
A public official's power or right to act in certain circumstances according
to personal judgment and conscience." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009).
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tion exists, there is a range of options properly available to the
decision-maker at a lower level, any of which must be permissible.13 The substance and process of such discretionary decisionmaking is more guided, more circumscribed or curtailed, in some
bodies of law than in others.5 4 The more guidance is given, the
more these discretionary decisions are tied to an established concept of "the law." The less guided they are, the more the implication for the reviewing judge is one that allows (or even requires) a
degree of second-guessing the original decision-maker based on
how the reviewing judge would have made the original decision."
Plenty of language in case law and in secondary materials insists
that decisions about abuse of discretion ought not to be about second-guessing, or about the application of a different (and not necessarily better) judicial instinct, but without other content to fill
the standard, these may well be further instances that explicitly
invite the judge's personal views into the mix." If that is so, those
personal views ought to be as freely expressed as those noted
above in response to the standards like "unconscionable" and
"shocks the conscience." They should be as freely expressed not
just for purposes of transparency and understanding of what goes
on in the process of judicial decision-making," but also to provide
53. Id. at 11 (defining "Abuse of discretion" as: "1. An adjudicator's failure to exercise
sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making . .. . 2. An appellate court's standard for
reviewing a decision that is asserted to be grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence."
54. See Cravens, supra note 51, 947 passim.
55. Id. One assessment of the propriety ofrule-departures by public officials suggests
that discretionary decisions may be the only proper ground for judicial departures from the
rule of law in deference to the judge's own preferences. See also MORTIMER R. KADISH &
SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM
LEGAL RULES 91 (1973).

56. Or as one panel from the Eighth Circuit put the issue, using the term "'judicial
grace'":
An exercise of the power to require the Government to furnish the defendant with a
copy of his confession would of course, be wholly a matter of judicial grace. There
could hardly be any need to exercise it, where the attempt to obtain a copy manifestly
was simply a part of a blunderbuss-roving, so that the privilege thereby would tend
to reach the stature of an absolute right. But there may be cases where the circumstances are such that the judicial conscience properly feels that the interest of justice
will be best served by allowing the defendant before trial to have a copy of his confession.
Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 845 (8th Cir. 1949).
57. See, e.g., Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1540 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern, as matter of belief and conscience, about transparency to
public about what goes on in death penalty cases). A separate dissent in the same case
ended with the dissenter's statement that he "decline[d] to participate further in the unconscionable delays that have occurred in reaching a final determination in this matter."
Id. at 1546 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
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better guidance to the lower court decision-makers about what lies
inside and outside the bounds of the standards that apply to their
work.
D.

DifferentiatingPersonaland InstitutionalConscience

Though this article specifically excludes certain types of decisions for purposes of its discussion, there is really nothing to limit
the subject matter of the cases in which these statements of judicial conscience may be found. They crop up in a multitude of matters from the most dramatic issues of personal dignity and liberty,
to those of discrimination, to personal injury cases, will contests,
and even seemingly mundane matters of statutory interpretation
implicating significant issues about the role of the courts, or the
doing of justice. There is, however, one significant line that can be
drawn, cutting across the divisions of subject matter. It is not a
perfectly clear or exact line, but it is an important one nonetheless. It is the line between expressions of personal conscience and
expressions of the institutionalconscience of the judiciary.
When we look at what judges actually say, in the cases in which
they note either a conflict or a consonance between the law and
the judicial conscience, the categories of subject matter are not
hermetically sealed from one another. They do bleed over into one
another, and of course this makes sense. While the judge inhabits
the judicial role, the judge is both a person and a professional at
the same time. And of course, as is often stated in response to arguments promoting an ideal of completely impartial and impersonal judging, judges are human." Their humanity and their profession can meet and mix in perfectly acceptable and even desirable ways, such that the personal conscience itself may independently require a strict adherence to the institutionally-loyal
judicial conscience. There is also a substantial patch of grey,
where conscience of an undefined nature is muddled into an argument that the other judges on the case actually do have the law
itself wrong. But the division of these two categories, to the extent
that it can be achieved, is still quite useful.
One of the first and most basic observations one can make about
any expression of conscience in an opinion is that of the pronoun
used in conjunction with the statement of conscience, and specifi58. Or to use Professor Fiss' terms, judges are "thoroughly socialized member[s] of a
profession." OWEN FISS, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 173 (2003).
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cally, whether it is singular or plural. There is usually a difference between saying, on the one hand "I cannot in good conscience
...

or on the other hand, "We cannot in good conscience

...

While the plural "we" is more often used when the reference appears in a majority opinion (and typically that is in a unanimous
panel), the plural may also be found in a concurrence or dissent
when the judge means to emphasize the perspective of the institution of the judiciary, rather than his or her own individual perspective. By contrast, when the singular "I" is used, it often
makes explicit the specific intention to make reference to the individual perspective. That first-person perspective might be tempered by language that underscores an individual understanding
of an institutional perspective or responsibility," or it might be
left as a purely personal conviction being brought to bear on the
case." In any case, the pronoun or referent may be a helpful
(though certainly not dispositive) starting point in understanding
the motivation and the intended perspective of the one expressing
the conscientious view.
E. Roadmap
With all this as background, this article will go on to explore
first judicial expressions of institutional conscience," then judicial
expressions of predominantly personal conscience,6 2 and the muddy middle ground in which the two are most closely intertwined."
It will then go on to assess the legitimacy of these expressions,
particularly with regard to the placement of the expressions in
concurring and dissenting opinions." Finally, it will suggest areas
for further exploration of these and related questions.

59. See, e.g., United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1978) (Coleman, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging the correct statement of law by the majority, but stating personal opposition to that established law based on personal experience in the system).
60. See, e.g., Rico v. Terhune, 63 F. App'x. 394, 394 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
61. See discussion infra Section III.
62. See discussion infra Section IV.
63. See discussion infra Section V.
64. See discussion infra Section VI.
65. See discussion infra Section VII.
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III. EXPRESSIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE
A.

Basic Themes

One major theme that emerges from the exploration of federal
appellate statements of conscientious decision-making is, unsurprisingly, a theme of responsibility for the integrity of the institution of the courts. Of course, this commitment to the integrity of
the institution may be personal or professional or both, but the
focus in these cases is on speaking for the institution. Any opinion, but particularly separate opinions, either concurrences or dissents, may note at least some concern for the reputation (sometimes stated in terms of morality) of the institution, lest the particular court or the broader institution of the judiciary, be implicated in doing injustice." These expressions of institutional conscience cover a wide array of topics, but they are united in their
commitment to ideals of professional responsibility of the role.
There is often an explicit statement of commitment to the law and
to the role of the judge as one separate from the other branches,
specifically restrained from the law-making function. An opinion
may note the conflict between the commitment to that role and a
personal commitment to conscience, justice, etc., but explicitly
leave the problem to the other (law-making) branches to resolve.
Of course, there is not always a conflict in these cases. Opinions
can and do include references to acting in good conscience in following the law, in a way wholly consistent with an idea of integrity in the judicial role. However, the lack of a conflict to resolve or
a stand to be taken means that these cases do not add much to
this discussion.
Ultimately the importance of this category of cases is in the legitimate added value attached to the role of the speaker as a
judge, as an applier of laws, as a part of the institution in practice,
day by day, case by case, and over a long stretch of time. The emphasis that is useful here is the emphasis on the worth of informed institutional conscience, built up over time from this special perspective on the operation of the law in practice. Judges in
these instances are not speaking from personal but rather institutional perspectives. They are not expressing their individual or
personal commitments. Instead, they are expressing what can (or
66. See, e.g., Campbell I, 18 F.3d 662, 729 (9th Cir.) (Poole, J., dissenting) (discussing
how the majority opinion, which is inconsistent with the dignity of man, will harm reputation of court), reh'g denied, 20 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
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should) be expected of the institution of our system of law, justice,
courts, and so on, and the ways in which a special perspective
from the bench shows that the result in the case does or does not
meet these expectations.
Judges are uniquely situated to see the practical application of
the law across a variety of circumstances. They see the law in
practice with a breadth and a specificity of application that legislators, for example, may not have the full capacity to anticipate.
In a trusteeship model, judges bear special responsibility for
bringing that perspective to bear in the best interests of the institution of the courts and the corpus of the law. This is not to say
that all expressions of judicial conscience relating to institutional
responsibility are a matter of unanimous conviction. Judges' perspectives from this special vantage point differ. Judges disagree
on these matters just as surely as they do on matters of direct interpretation and application of substantive law.
There are several common categories or subject matter areas into which expressions of institutional conscience may be divided for
discussion. Major issues that tend to provoke these expressions,
and therefore the subsections to be addressed below, include adherence to precedent, separation of powers, due process, burdens
on court resources, credibility or reputation of the courts, and denials of rehearings en banc.
B.

Adherence to Precedent

Perhaps one of the most obvious and apparently straightforward
matters of conscientious institutional judicial responsibility is that
of adherence to precedent. It is a basic commitment and expectation at every level of judging that these trustees of the law will not
simply make up the law as they go along, but will respect the rule
of law and the doctrine of stare decisis." Stare decisis is not an
entirely inflexible doctrine, of course. There are appropriate times
and places for breaking with precedent, but those are generally
taken to be the province of highest courts, rather than intermediate appellate courts. Adherence to precedent, therefore, is an in67. A straightforward example of this commitment, in which there is also a reference to
conscience, appears in a Tenth Circuit panel's opinion as follows: "Although defendants
present a provocative argument, we cannot agree with it without forsaking the rule of law. .
. . In good conscience, therefore, we cannot conclude the defendants' double jeopardy argument has validity." United States v. Dominguez-Carmona, 202 F.3d 283, *2 (10th Cir.
1999).
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teresting testing ground for ideas about institutional conscience,
especially as expressed in separate opinions.
It is not unusual to find expressions in majority opinions that
note the weighty obligation to follow precedent, but also drop a
hint or more of dissatisfaction with that precedent. A simple example might look something like this:
Although the Blanset and Tooahnippah cases require us to affirm the judgment in the Secretary's favor, we cannot in good
conscience do so without expressing our dissatisfaction with
this state of the law."
This keeps the model of restrained judging intact, and demonstrates a fundamental respect for this central obligation of the judiciary to respect the doctrine of stare decisis. That said, it still
claims (without directly claiming any authority to do so) a role for
judicial conscience, which looks beyond the question of whether
the precedent is binding, to examine the question of whether it is
right.

Other opinions take a somewhat more clearly articulated approach, such as the following:
Were the question of parole ineligibility before this Court for
the first time, the considerable appeal of these recent decisions might persuade us to a like position. However, in Trujillo v. United States, . . . this Court rejected the argument

that parole ineligibility is a consequence of a guilty plea within the meaning of Rule 11. We are bound by that result. We
therefore conclude, as we did in Trujillo, that the trial judge
was not required to inform defendant of his ineligibility for
parole... . We cannot in good conscience find any meaningful
difference for purposes of Rule 11 between ineligibility for probation and ineligibilityfor parole. We therefore conclude that

Trujillo is equally binding on both questions.... This panel
being impotent to overrule Trujillo we abide and apply its
edict."

This excerpt points specifically to core judicial role obligations and
key judicial skills as matters of conscientious fulfillment of insti68. Akers v. Morton, 499 F.2d 44, 47 (9th Cir. 1974) (unanimous panel opinion) (emphasis added).
69. Sanchez v. United States, 417 F.2d 494, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1969) (unanimous panel
opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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tutional responsibility. In the course of the reasoning, the panel
(unanimously and thus expressing its views with the word "we")
looks to binding authority at the outset, explores other case law
and rules, and tests for meaningful distinctions as to the application of the law to the circumstances before the court. This is appellate judicial work at its most basic and straightforward, but
expressed specifically as a matter of conscientious judicial responsibility when the court is faced with the fact that it has no power
to reach a result it would prefer. The court makes a special effort
to emphasize the weight of the institutional responsibility that
constrains its judgment.
On the other hand, a majority opinion might express dissatisfaction with the established law by pointing to a separate opinion in
the same case to emphasize the point, as here:
Despite our conclusion, we agree with the sentiments expressed in the dissent. This is an unfortunate outcome in a
sympathetic case. To remove a single mother of three who has
lawfully lived and worked in the United States for two decades, despite the family upheaval and separation that it will
entail, is "unconscionable,"see Dissent at 62; that this pro se
petitioner has been unable to obtain review of the BIA's decision to deny relief because of procedural errors is also unfair.
However, the result we reach is dictated by existing law and
does not, as a matter of law, violate the Due Process Clause.
See Dissent at 62.70

The propriety of such expressions of discontent or disagreement
with the precedent that must be applied as a matter of conscientious fulfillment of judicial obligation depends somewhat on the
manner of the expression. In each of the examples offered so far,
the tone is measured and respectful and underscores the obligation without questioning its validity or importance. On the one
hand, one might argue that any expression beyond the mechanical
application of the relevant precedent is out-of-bounds, as tending
to reveal the individual perspective of those on a particular panel.
Some might find any such expression undesirable for the fact that
it raises genuine concerns about whether legal results may differ
based on judicial assignments in a given case. These may, however, be desirable expressions of disagreement, couched as they are
70. Carranza v. Holder, 356 F. App'x. 61, 62 (9th Cir. 2009) (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
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in respect for a restrained role at the intermediate appellate level.
They simply raise issues here or there, either for consideration by
another body (be it a higher court or a legislature), or as signals to
the broader public to show an awareness of and concern for the
broader issues implicated by important matters before them,
along with a sensibility of their inability to act on those issues.
This kind of special perspective from the bench, properly restrained in light of recognition of the superseding obligation to
follow precedent, adds value because it may well underscore consistency across judges and panels in light of deference to precedent, in such a way as to bolster public confidence in the judiciary.
One step further along the expressive line, a judge might
acknowledge the obligation to follow precedent, but at the same
time emphasize a disagreement with that precedent by placing the
expression in a separate concurring opinion. Without any concrete
rules to guide the purpose or content of concurring opinions, one
must look to the broader underlying theory of the judicial role to
assess what is and is not appropriate here. Sometimes these expressions are quite brief and simple. In three separate cases, for
example, Judge Reinhardt used nearly identical language to express his position on various applications of the three-strikes
law." In these cases, his concurrence reads: "I concur only under
the compulsion of the Supreme Court's decision in Andrade. I believe the sentence is both unconscionable and unconstitutional."72
Sometimes such straightforward expressions are followed by a
fuller elaboration, as in the case of a concurring opinion by Judge
Kozinski, which begins: "I reluctantly join the court's opinion because I believe it faithfully applies the law of this circuit. The result we reach is difficult to reconcile, however, with good sense,
good conscience or good law."73 He continues for a few pages to
explain this position, as opposed to leaving it at the distilled expression found in the three-strikes concurrences by Judge Reinhardt."
71. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding California's three-strikes
law).
72. Turner v. Candelaria, 64 F. App'x. 647, 648 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J., concurring); see also Wallace v. Castro, 65 F. App'x. 618, 619 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (adding specification of the crime-petty theft-for which the sentence was being
imposed); cf Rico v. Terhune, 63 F. App'x. 394, 394 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J., specially
concurring).
73. Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. Giorgi, 788 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 623-35.
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Sometimes the expressions of disagreement are a bit more involved than the former simple and straightforward samples, as in
this excerpt from one of Judge Selya's concurrences:
Under existing Supreme Court precedent, this is a close and
vexing case .... In my view, this self-induced schizophrenia
muddies the law and disrupts the balance that Congress labored to strike . ... This reasoning leads me to conclude, with

all respect, either that Congress inadvertently muddied the
waters in phrasing LHWCA § 905(b), or, alternatively, that
Jones & Laughlin was wrongly decided. Still, I recognize that
the Supreme Court's opinion is binding on this court, and that

we therefore must undertake what Judge Campbell charitably terms "an elusive quest.". . . Once reconciled to that necessity, I can in good consciencejoin this court's cogent opinion. I

write separately, however, to urge the Supreme Court and
Congress to reflect upon the mind games that Jones & Laughlin-particularly as applied to harbor workers-compels us to
play, and, hopefully, to revisit the question of whether "dual
capacity" employers should be liable at all in negligence actions brought by their employees.
This example shows how such a concurrence can demonstrate by
its own terms its focus on institutional responsibility, emphasizing
not just the individual views of its authors, but also an institutional concern for clarity, consistency, and reason in the law. A
dissent in the same case takes the same perspective but goes so
far as to say that these institutional concerns for legitimacy compel that judge to dissent."
Another possibility is that a majority opinion itself might, without explicit comment, fail to follow precedent because, as a matter
of conscience, the judges on the panel do not wish to follow it, but
cases actually expressing this position as such are unlikely to be
found. A majority opinion must present its reasoning, or at any
rate justify it, as well founded in legal argument, which may reveal a weakness in the majority position without giving an idea of
conscientious objection underlying the decision. However, one
may more readily find dissenting opinions that claim to unveil
75. Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, JIV, 97 F.3d 603, 616 (1st Cir. 1996) (Selya, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 616-24 (Cyr, J., dissenting). Judge Cyr does not specifically refer to conscience in his own words, but does so implicitly by responding to Judge Selya's remark.
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such behavior on the part of the majority. Examples of such dissenting expressions of a conscientious need to more closely conform to institutional obligations take forms like the following:
Although I applaud the withdrawal of the panel opinion, I
cannot in good consciencejoin the opinion of the en banc court;

that opinion admittedly edges closer to the holding demanded
by clearly established law, but stops short of adhering to it
and, thus, perpetuates a constitutionally intolerable result.
Respectfully and regretfully, I dissent."
Or: "Thus, although I might personally prefer the rule espoused
by the majority, I cannot in good conscience reconcile it with
ERISA's exceptionally broad preemptive language, nor with the
Supreme Court's and our construction of it."" These examples
show that although the judge recognizes and is personally sympathetic to what might be a preferable outcome according to the
judge's own view, that sympathy is overridden by conscientious
commitment to the role and responsibility of the judge in following
established law. It is only in a dissent because the others on the
panel saw things otherwise. Some, however, take more issue with
such departures by a majority opinion:
I strongly oppose the filing of this opinion. In my view, it cavalierly disregardsboth Supreme Court guidelines and our own
case precedent and cannot be sanctioned in good conscience.

The merits of appellant's case should not be addressed."
Or:
At a time like the present when the federal courts are overburdened with cases of national import and when the right to
remove causes on grounds of diversity has become of more
than doubtful utility . . . it seems strange that this court
should cavalierly turn its back on so much thoughtful precedent and lay down rules subversive of the statute, merely be-

77. Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1997) (Selya, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
78. Campbell v. Aerospace Corp., 123 F.3d 1308, 1317 (9th Cir. 1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
79. Clephas v. Fagelson, Shonberger, Payne & Arthur, 719 F.2d 92, 95 (4th Cir. 1983)
(Hall, J., concurring) (agreeing with the conclusion of the majority opinion but disagreeing
with the decision to address the merits of the appeal in the first place).
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cause it feels that in this particularcase justice and good conscience' require that a 'manifest error'be corrected."

Examples like these last two underscore the conscientious institutional responsibility to respect the rule of adherence to precedent,
and do not express their disagreement with the majority primarily
as a personal matter, but rather as an institutional matter, taking
their colleagues to task as remiss in their obligations.
That said, some dissents may present similar arguments, taking
their colleagues to task for following precedent when a value such
as "justice" (according to the dissent) compels otherwise. These
examples present particularly close cases when the majority explicitly considers itself to be compelled to follow precedent. So, for
example, a part-concurrence, part-dissent explains:
It is unconscionable that we do not afford Thompson the opportunity to test such crucial evidence before a district court
judge. As some of my colleagues in the majority surely recognize, the fact that it now appears inevitable that Thompson's
execution will go forward is truly a travesty of justice. Although I respect the majority's belief that it is bound by precedent and statute to reach the decision it does, I simply do not
agree that the law requires that result."'
Or yet more starkly, as Judge Martin wrote in a dissenting opinion in a capital case:
This state of affairs I find unconscionable, even as I remain
bound to apply the laws of this court and of the Supreme
Court . . . . "[It] is not justice. It is caprice" . . . . Jason Getsy
and John Santine are not hypothetical players in a criminal
law final exam. They are real people who committed real
crimes, indeed, the same crimes. That Getsy will be put to
death while Santine will be spared, and that the law (at least
according to the majority) actually sanctions this result,
makes it virtually impossible for me to answer in the affirmative what Justice Blackmun viewed as the fundamental question . . . namely, does our system of capital punishment "accu-

80. Bucy v. Nev. Constr. Co., 125 F.2d 213, 221 (9th Cir. 1942) (Healy, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
81. Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 937 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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rately and consistently determine" which defendants "deserve" to die and which do not?8 2
A middle-road position on conscience and adherence to precedent is to follow precedent, but, as a matter of fulfillment of conscientious obligation, explicitly signal to the legislature, as the
proper authority, to change the problematic precedent." This indicates a conscientious commitment not just to carrying out the
role of the judge, but also a broader commitment (appropriate to
the trusteeship model) to work by appropriate means for the betterment of the law itself. So, for example, one majority opinion
following a relevant precedent further states that: "We can only
hope that this decision appears to Congress as the distress flag
that it is, and that Congress will act to limit, as only it is empowered to, the statute's application to cases such as the one before us
now."" A concurring opinion along similar substantive lines uses
different and more vivid language, laying out the charge of congressional responsibility for the current state of the law, concluding: "Unfortunately, Congress has taken away the court's ability
to use its informed discretion in these matters, placing any discretion instead in the prosecution. Under existing law, one can only
hope that prosecutors will use that discretion wisely."" Finally,
one example of a dissent in this same vein involves a much more
direct plea: "As I have said before, 'I pray that soon the good men
and women in our Congress will ameliorate the plight of families
like the [petitioners] and give us humane laws that will not cause
the disintegration of such families.'"" All of these examples,
whether in majority, concurrence, or dissent, underscore a desire
for the system to get the law right, even if it is beyond the scope of
the judge's own authority to achieve that directly.
Some might question even the relatively mild and restrained
approach of incorporating and expressing conscientious views into
opinions as being beyond the proper scope of the judicial role.
82. Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 327 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
83. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Keisler, 251 F. App'x 435, 436 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Robinson, 110 F.3d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J.,
concurring); Ill. Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1985) (unanimous
panel opinion).
84. Ill. Dep't ofRevenue, 771 F.2d at 317.
85. Robinson, 110 F.3d at 1329 (Heaney, J., concurring).
86. Gonzales, 251 F. App'x. at 436 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).

Winter 2013

In Good Conscience

123

However, where it is a matter of the special perspective from the
bench that reveals unanticipated problems or inconsistent results
in the application of established law, this is a valuable contribution that a judge may make, and a written opinion is an appropriate place to do it. While placement of such an expression in a majority opinion is unobjectionable, the best approach, perhaps, is
placement in a concurrence, where it marks an attitude of compliance and restraint, while using the rhetorical device of a separate
opinion to draw special attention to the issue. Where a judge genuinely believes that faithfulness to institutional conscience requires a different result than that reached by the majority, a dissent may well be appropriate, despite any signals it sends to the
public about potential instability of the law.
C.

Separationof Powers

Turning to issues of separation of powers, there is of course general consensus on the basic role and responsibilities of the court
with regard to separation of powers, but there is inconsistency in
how judges view the specific boundaries of the separation in any
given case. Thus, there is inconsistency in the expression of institutional conscience in this area. There are distinctions, for instance, among those cases in which the "conscientious" view indicates some measure of regret that the court must restrain itself
from further action, those that assert separation of powers more
neutrally as a factor that leaves only a limited role for judicial
conscience, and those that deny that restraint is required. The
cases in this last category assert that an aspect of conscientious
judging is to take on whatever is even arguably within the judicial
province, in order to do justice, rather than ceding too easily
whatever control might pique the interest of another branch.
Straightforward (even unanimous) opinions in the first category
might make reference to separation of powers as a matter of conscience along these lines:
Using estoppel as a shield implies nothing less than frustrating the government's authority to enforce valid laws. We cannot in good conscience accept a broad rule that prevents the
sovereign from enforcing valid laws for no better reason than

that a government official has performed his enforcement duties negligently. It does not overstate the case to say that such
a rule would risk embroiling the judiciary in the Executive
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Branch's duty faithfully to execute the law and thereby would
raise separation of powers concerns."
The same sort of statements may be found where the concern
about overstepping bounds relates to the legislative branch:
We can only conclude, as did the trial court, that the Congress
intended to permit the taxpayer to obtain the benefit, taxwise,
only of so much of the cost of construction of, or improvements
to, a new house as the taxpayer had constructed and used
within the eighteen month period herein applicable. We cannot in good conscience rewrite the statute as though it include

the words 'contractual liabilities incurred during the 18
months period.' The desire of the Congress to provide finality

to the deferment provisions of Section 112(n) must regretfully
be respected. Any relief to taxpayers must lie with the legislative ratherthan the judicialbranch of the government."

In this talk of rewriting statutes, one can see the desire on the
part of the court to achieve the "right" result, as well as the fact
that the desire is overridden by the conscientious institutional
responsibility to leave the lawmaking function to the legislative
branch. The very fact that the struggle shows up in a majority
opinion, though, shows just how strongly both forces pull on the
judges who want to do the best within the bounds of their role.
When a dissenting judge actually sees the applicable law as less
constraining as a substantive matter, though, a separate opinion
may suggest that the majority actually can follow the values they
desired to fulfill in the first place:
I respectfully dissent. While my brothers agree that the result to the taxpayer is 'an example of inequities' in income tax
laws, they do not feel able to reverse the case. The statute
and the regulations all use the word 'made' as the critical
word. In the context in which this word is used, it is ambiguous.89
87. Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 171 F.3d 58, 66 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted); accord Rodos v. Michaelson, 527 F.2d 582, 585 (1st Cir. 1975)
(unanimous panel opinion) ("In sum, we do not reach the question whether the legislature
has disregarded the mandate of the Supreme Court, for we cannot, in good conscience, say
that the Attorney General cannot stand on his rights.").
88. Kern v. Granquist, 291 F.2d 29,33 (9th Cir. 1961) (emphasis added).
89. Id. (Hamlin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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There is thus no difference between the judges here about what
institutional conscience requires. All of the judges on the panel
here would surely agree that it is the conscientious obligation of
the court to follow the law, whether they approve of it or not.
There is simply a difference of interpretation of the substantive
law involved, so that where the law does permit the result that the
judges prefer with reference to other institutional commitments,
there may even be an institutional conscientious obligation to retain authority and not to defer to another branch.
Some judges may write separately in cases where institutional
responsibility must trump personal preference as an outlet to
achieve a heightened expression of that conscientious constraint,
but the institutional norms compel them to stay in their proper
roles. Thus Judge Van Graafeiland wrote, in a concurring opinion:
I concur in this case with great reluctance and wish that I
could do otherwise. It seems unconscionable to me that this

seventy-four year old widow who lived with Joseph Thomas
for forty-seven years and bore ten of his children is now to be
branded an adulteress, with whatever ramifications to her
and her children that may result from this adjudication. See
Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting). However, we must apply the law
as Congress wrote it, not as we would like to have had it written.90

Here we can see the judge's personal views on the issue before the
court in the transparent language about reluctance and wishing
that the law could be otherwise. The fact that these views are not
hidden may even add to the judge's credibility; and certainly in
light of the accompanying explanation of why the result cannot be
otherwise in light of the controlling law, the opinion will support a
better understanding of the decision-making process.
In a concurrence in a case involving sentencing, there was a further reference, not just to congressional control over the law, but
to the fact that Congress had acted specifically to remove the relevant power of the judiciary that had existed before:
90. Thomas v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1990) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting)). It is notable that in expressing this disagreement with the
law, the judge cited one of his own prior dissenting opinions. See id. Repeated conscientious dissents are discussed further herein. See discussion infra Section III.G.
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The contrast between that punishment and Robinson's, in
light of the relative culpability, is unconscionable. Unfortunately, Congress has taken away the court's ability to use its
informed discretion in these matters, placing any discretion
instead in the prosecution. Under existing law, one can only
hope that prosecutors will use that discretion wisely."
This example demonstrates the use of conscientious expression of
institutional responsibility to defend judicial territory, but it remains restrained in that it implicates no action in trying to take
that territory by force-this remains, placed as it is in a concurring opinion, merely a matter of expression, not action. Along
quite similar lines, a unanimous panel opinion from the Eleventh
Circuit includes the following statement:
Congress, in a proper exercise of its legislative power, has decided that murder, like thefts from interstate commerce and
the counterfeiting of securities, qualifies as racketeering activity. This, of course, ups the ante for RICO violators who
personally would not contemplate taking a human life.
Whether there is a moral imbalance in the equation of thieves
and counterfeiters with murderers is a question whose answer
lies in the halls of Congress, not in the judicialconscience.92

There are times, though, when that regret about the practical
limitations imposed by the doctrine of separation of powers is apparently insufficient as an expression of the judicial conscience,
and a judge feels compelled to dissent.9 3 Taking on directly the
issues presented by the role of empathy in the potential desire of a
court to resolve a question of law differently from the legislature,
Judge Moore wrote:
.The proponents of the 'fraudulent concealment' doctrine have
overwhelming arguments in their favor-mostly emotional. To
reward 'wrongdoers who are successful in cloaking their unlawful activities with secrecy through cunning, deceptive and
clandestine practices' and then 'when their machinations are
91. United States v. Robinson, 110 F.3d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
92. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 905 (5th Cir. 1978) (unanimous panel opinion) (emphasis added).
93. Such expressions, in which the personal conscience contends closely with the institutional conscience, are discussed further herein. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
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discovered' to give to them 'the shield of the statute of limitations to bar redress by those whom they have victimized'
would appear to be unconscionable. .

.

. Another court chose

to believe that 'Congress did not intend that co-conspirators
could spin and weave an impenetrable shroud of fraudulent
concealment to cloak their illegal acts and then fraudulently
render themselves immune with the shield of the statute of
limitations to bar redress by those who are the victims of their
conspiratorial machinations.' . . . But equally unconscionable,
however, would be the case of the poor widow who, left penniless upon the death of her spouse caused by the gross negligence of some malefactor, has failed to bring an action within
the prescribed statutory period.

..

. It may well be that a 'dis-

covery' or 'fraudulent concealment' amendment should be
added to § 4B but the public policy and the morals issues
which are involved in such legislation should be for the Congress to resolve-not the courts. Otherwise the courts in addition
to their other endeavors assume a veto power over Congressional enactments whenever their views on such issues differ
with those of Congress.94

This kind of straightforward attempt to put the issue on the table
and explain where the law stands and what can and cannot happen to change it is of tremendous value. Acknowledgment of difficult issues and transparency of reasoning are themselves the fulfillment of the conscientious obligations imposed by the judicial
role for the integrity and proper functioning of the institution.
It is not just the questions of substantive law that raise institutional conscientious concerns. Courts may also raise conscientious
institutional concerns about pragmatic questions of judicial resources as they implicate separation of powers issues, as in this
excerpt from a unanimous panel opinion:
However, the vindication of almost every legal right has an
impact on the allocation of scarce resources. And the courts,
while mindful of the impact of remedies upon persons not before them, can hardly permit the legal rights of litigants to

turn upon the alleged inability of the defendant fully to meet
his obligations to others.

. .

. We agree with the Second Cir-

cuit that the existence of similar orders in other jurisdictions
94. AtI. City Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 241-42, 244 (2d Cir. 1962)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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supports the relief granted here, but also that it is likely that
an ultimate, comprehensive solution to the problem of hearing
delays may well require congressional action. .

.

. We cannot

in good conscience, however, deny relief to the plaintiffs pend-

ing such action. We conclude that this case presents a justiciable controversy and turn accordingly to the question of
whether the delays complained of have denied plaintiffs their
right to a "reasonable . .. opportunity for a hearing.""

Here, once again, there is an acknowledgment of the difficulty facing the court in making a decision in the case before it, set in the
context of broader institutional commitments to various entities,
with the judge acting as trustee of the law, but still having limited
authority within which to fulfill its trusteeship obligations. Talking about the mindfulness and the conscience of the court in the
context of the proper allocation of its resources underscores for
readers of the opinion the level of concern on the part of the court,
and at the same time demonstrates its conscientious commitment.
to acting within its authority to do whatever it can to achieve the
right outcome, both of which are helpful for public confidence.
D.

Due Process

Turning next to issues of due process, one sees at the most basic
level of conscientious concern for the institution of the judicial system, a concern for staying within the bounds of certain bedrock
procedural constraints. So, for example, a per curiam opinion
states plainly: "We cannot in good conscience affirm a summary
judgment if we are not satisfied that the appellant had been given
an opportunity upon notice to oppose the grant below."96 But even
seemingly basic or fundamental matters of due process can be fodder for judicial disagreement as when, for example, a dissenting
opinion states: "It is just that I cannot in good conscience join in
reversing a decision in which I see no error."" Or, still straightforward, but with a bit more elaboration: "The government removed Tomas Mendez-Alcaraz .

.

. from this country based on a

criminal conviction that violated his procedural due process rights
95. Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1978) (unanimous panel opinion)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
96. Hispanics for Fair and Equitable Reapportionment v. Griffin, 958 F.2d 24, 25 (2d
Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
97. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Nichols,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Because such an unconscionable result cannot be affirmed, I dissent.""
Adding the extra component of prejudice (as a matter of practical unfairness), a panel opinion from the District of Columbia Circuit includes the following explanation of the role played by conscience:
Yet our reading of the transcript is such as to convince us that
the prosecutor stepped out of bounds, that the impact of this
plain error, in the context of a close case, was probably so
prejudicial that our judicial conscience calls upon us to re-

verse and remand for a new trial that can be conducted free of
similar error."
Along similar lines, augmenting straightforward legal conclusions
about due process with practical fairness concerns, Judge Clay
wrote: "Allowing defendants to be tried and convicted under a
knowingly unfair jury selection system in the Eastern District of
Michigan is unconscionable; allowing Mr. Blair to be twice subjected to an unfair jury selection system would be even worse.""o
This example shows an expression of conscience that is still relatively matter-of-fact and straightforward. In other examples, by
contrast, there is a more deeply heartfelt plea directed at the important role played by the conscience of the court, as seen here in
a dissenting opinion by Judge Altimari:
It is a bitter irony that in this era in which totalitarian regimes are adopting the language of freedom and looking to
the United States as a model of liberty and justice, we today
find it acceptable that a man who has not been charged with a
crime in this country may remain incarcerated here indefinitely. I have always believed that a major difference between
our Constitution and those that speak of justice in bold terms,
but fail to provide it in reality, is that our Constitution provides for a judicial branch that is charged with the task of
safeguarding individuals' rights, be they citizens or not. Con-

cededly, there is a difference between the rights of citizens as
98. Mendez-Alcaraz v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
99. King v. United States, 372 F.2d 383, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (emphasis added).
100. United States v. Blair, 214 F.3d 690, 703 (6th Cir. 2000) (Clay, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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compared to those of non-citizens. The facts of this case, however, clearly transcend these differences. Ultimately, it is
judges who must give substantive content to the meaning of
the Constitution. Thus, I cannot in good conscience sit idly by
and allow the Due Process Clause to become mere words. Be-

cause I believe that the Due Process Clause will not permit an
indefinite confinement, or even the confinement for eight
years, of an individual who has not been criminally charged
and is merely awaiting deportation, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to the
court to set appropriate bail.'
The mixture of use of both singular pronouns and collective references to judges here shows a heightened personal aspect to what
is, in substantive terms, clearly an appeal to institutional conscience. This appeal demonstrates that these are not wholly objective matters, but ones well within the bounds of the role that
concern individual occupants of the judicial role quite deeply.
Still other examples from various contexts show that some judges see it as clearly within the court's province to consider questions of morality in the assessment of due process. Judge Lay, on
the Eighth Circuit, put this in vivid terms, and expressed it in
terms of judicial conscience:
The most degrading,humiliating experience any human being,
white or red, rich or poor, intelligent or not, can endure is a
deprivationof one's personal liberty. To permit this under the

circumstances existing here without any legal representation
whatsoever is a mockery of the law itself. Before anyone for-

feits his life or liberty, he should at least be given a meaningful opportunity to resort to the law which abhors forfeiture
without proof of factual guilt and without positive indication
of the existence of power of the committing authority. This to
me is the essence of due process. I cannot in good conscience
subscribe to the proposition that Nelson Miner has been afforded this protection.'0 2

101. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 1991) (Altimari, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
102. United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 428 F.2d 623, 639 (8th Cir. 1970) (Lay, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Here, the blending of the objective assertions with the ultimate
resort to the personal perspective shows room for conscientious
disagreement on matters of legal interpretation at the same time
that it shows the deep importance of these issues to the judges
who deal with them. 10
There can be somewhat muddled and therefore, potentially confusing language in the due process context that seems to suggest
that resorting to one aspect of conscientious concern when the content of the expression betrays it really addresses another. One
example in this category states specifically as an "individual opinion" what is most certainly also (if not instead) a view about institutional responsibility with regard to fairness and justice in the
predictability of the application of the law. Judge Boreman, in
part concurrence, part dissent, explains this matter of conscience
as follows:
It is my individual opinion that changing the establishedrules
in the middle of the game is unjust, unfair, and inconsistent
with the operation of a viable system of legal precedents, par-

ticularly to a taxpayer such as this one with a relatively small
amount at stake. The controlling law of this Circuit, as it ex-

isted at the time of taxpayer's transaction, should be applied
and taxpayer should have the right to any tax benefit available to it under Pridemark.It is unconscionable to hold otherwise. In all fairness and justice I cannot be persuaded to join

in placing the taxpayer in such an unfavorable and unreasonable position by a denial of prospective application of our decision which definitely changes the rules of the game.104
The identification of this expression as an "individual opinion" is
trumped by the judge's resort to principles of basic operation of
103. Some seventy years earlier, another judge on the same circuit made similar substantive statements about the role of the courts, not using terms of "conscience," but rather
of morality, justice, and fair dealing. See Evans-Snider-Buel v. McFadden, 105 F. 293, 30102 (8th Cir. 1900) (Sanborn, J., dissenting) ("When called upon to resolve questions like the
one in hand, the courts have never deemed it necessary to close their eyes to the equities of
the case, but have frequently permitted their judgments to be influenced by the consider ation that that which the legislature has done in the way of disturbing rights acquired under
existing laws was morally right, and in accordance with justice and fair dealing ....
It is
our privilege and duty, therefore, in determining whether a vested right has been violated
and whether congress exceeded its just power in validating the interpleader's mortgage, to
consider whether its action was dictated by a sense of justice, and was right when viewed
from a purely moral standpoint.") (emphasis added), affd, 185 U.S. 505 (1902).
104. Of Course, Inc. v. Comm'r, 499 F.2d 754, 761 (4th Cir. 1974) (Boreman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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the legal system. The insistence on applying the controlling law of
the jurisdiction, though it may be a principle to which the judge
does feel personally committed, is clearly not a predominantly
personal commitment, but rather an institutional one to which the
judge, as a matter of the role, has bought in. One must consider,
however, the extra rhetorical force given in such a situation by
resort to expression of this matter as a personal rather than a
purely institutional conscientious commitment.1 05
This takes us back to the bottom-line principle in the due process cases- which is ultimately about fidelity to the law, and particularly on the part of judges, fidelity to constitutional principles
of due process, which lies at the core of their trusteeship responsibilities. So, in a case containing discussion by the majority about
the propriety of an appeal to jurors to play the role of community
conscience,"o' Judge Jones expressed a conscientious view along
these quite straightforwardly institutional lines, focusing on the
judicial obligation of fidelity to the Constitution:
This dissent is compelled by the majority's validation of the
unpardonableconstitutionalimproprieties present in this rec-

ord. The effect of this validation is an intolerable abandonment of substantive and procedural principles deeply rooted
in Anglo Saxon and American constitutional jurisprudence.
Stated in its most simple form, these principles are designed
to protect individual rights from constitutional shortcuts. I
dissent here because ratherthan upholding these principles, as
courts are sworn to do, a grievous breakdown has occurred....
In this context, confidence in the outcome of Byrd's trial must
be, and is, seriously undermined. One cannot, in good conscience, blink at such substantial constitutional impropriety
with full comprehension of its deadly effects. In these circumstances, judicial neglect transforms the justice system into an
accomplice to constitutionaltransgression."o'

This is the most basic of conscientious institutional commitments.
As Justice Holmes and so many others have said, the job of the
judge is to apply the law. Compliance with constitutional principles must be foremost in the judge's fulfillment of the trusteeship
obligations of the law. Certainly there will be disagreements
105.
106.
107.

See discussion infra Section VI.B.
Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 538-39 (6th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 542, 548 (Jones, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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about the particular shape and application of those constitutional
principles, but as long as the judge's conscientious commitment is
to follow constitutional principles, where judicial conscience is
concerned, the obligation is fulfilled.
It is noteworthy that all of the examples in this section were
from dissents, or partial dissents, rather than from concurrences.
This is significant in that it demonstrates the difference between
those cases that are about the restraint required, for example, by
adherence to precedent or separation of powers principles. Due
process cases are more clearly about perspective within the
bounds of the judicial role, where there is less internal argument
about constraint by the law, and more about judgment in the application of the law as it is clearly established. There is more
room for perfectly proper disagreement among a panel of judges as
to what institutional conscience requires, and thus more range for
dissenting opinions.
E.

Burdens on Courts and Their Resources

As trustees not just of the law, but also of the institution of the
courts, judges are ideally situated to observe how their resources
of both time and money are consumed and what strains those resources. Often judges agree on how these matters play into the
law of the case,'os but there are a number of concurrences, part
concurrences and part dissents, and pure dissents that make reference to, or even rely on concerns about conscientious responsibility for the resources of the institution. In the pure concurrences,
the idea is often there to add an indicator of the broader implications or ramifications of the majority's (correct) application of law.
For example, in a recent case regarding prescription drug benefits,
Judge Fletcher wrote in concurrence:
I concur in the opinion, which carefully and painstakingly analyzes the claims. I add this concurrence simply to vent my

frustration. What have Uhms' counsel accomplished for the
Uhms, for justice, or for the law? .. . Today the Uhms receive
the prescription drug benefits to which they are entitled. But
108. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1991) ("W~e cannot in
good conscience burden the courts with litigation that is plainly unmeritorious.") (emphasis
added); Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d 1329, 1347 (5th Cir. 1989) ("We cannot in good
conscience remand this case to the district court for further fact finding. This litigation,
which has already consumed countless hours of judicial resources over its seven year life, at
some point must end. That point has been reached.") (emphasis added).
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not as a result of this lawsuit. The cost to the court system and
to the Uhms is unconscionable. A bit of common sense and attention to the available administrative remedies should have
been applied. Instead we have an opinion with endless pages
of legal analysis, months of study and delay, and a determination that no benefit can be awarded to the Uhms.s09
Along similar lines, but with perhaps an even broader perspective
about the institution of the judiciary and those bearing its costs,
Judge Garth wrote a concurring opinion in a case about a denial of
disability benefits, at least in part so that he could note how an
additional burden on administrative law judges would put an "unconscionable" burden on the taxpayers."o In a case about attorney's fees, Judge Bright concurred in part, but noting attorney
abuse of court resources, found that the problem of unconscionable
delay in getting to a resolution of the case in hand and the attendant waste of resources rose to the level of requiring a dissent."' And there are yet more examples." 2
There are, of course, pure dissents on such matters as well. One
notable example comes from an en banc case from the Eleventh
Circuit, which drew multiple separate opinions, including a dissent which noted that the burden of considering the writ at issue
109. Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) (Fletcher, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
110. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1189 (3d Cir. 1992) (Garth, J., concurring)
("[Ilf we require administrative law judges to give weight or credence to such unprofessional reports, it cannot help but impose an unconscionable strain on the taxpaying public-a
public which is already burdened with enormous social costs arising from health care
needs, disability benefits and the like.").
111. Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, 710 F.2d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 1983) (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I concur in the court's affirmance of the district
court's award of Jaquette's attorneys fees. I would not, however, remand the case to the
district court. This case has already consumed an inordinate amount of judicial, as well as
lawyers', time and effort. Simply stated, it is time to lay this case to rest.... After reviewing the record, it is evident that this case did not require such enormous expenditures of
time and money. I do not denegrate [sic] in any way the importance of the relief Jaquette
obtained. However, it is unconscionable that this case dragged on for nearly three years
before the parties reached an agreement which, according to Jaquette, would have been
acceptable at the very beginning of the litigation. . . . Although I share the majority's outrage regarding the inexcusable amounts of time and money expended on this case, I dissent
from that portion of the majority's opinion remanding the case to the district court. After
what is now nearly four years of the litigants exchanging charges and countercharges, I can
see no possible benefit of further prolonging this case.").
112. See, e.g., United States v. Whitson, 587 F.2d 948, 956 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kilkenny, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I am in complete disagreement with what is
said in footnote 6, page 525, of the majority's opinion [regarding trial court's obligation to
carefully control the scope of cross-examination by prosecutor]. This language places an
unconscionable burden on the shoulders of a trial judge.").
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was a moral one, and could not be left to concerns about judicial
efficiency or economy. 113 Finally, there are some expressions of
judicial conscience that indicate an institutional concern or responsibility for the practical enforceability of a burden they place
on other players in the justice system."' For example, even
though the judge in one case acknowledged that the majority had
a defensible position on the law, he could not "in good conscience"
join the opinion and in so doing subject police officers to the risks
the majority's rule would create for them."' This is a good example of a case in which there is an individual expression that underscores institutional responsibility.
F.

Credibilityand Reputation

Courts also express conscientious responsibility for the maintenance of the credibility and reputation of the judicial system itself,
and many take advantage of separate opinions to do so. For example, there are cases in which concerns about strong public feeling about a particular area of substantive law (such as the death
penalty) raises conscientious concern for institutional legitimacy,
and thus counsels particularly careful explanation of the decisionmaking process and institutional insistence on pursuing whatever
process will best ensure that the court gets the law right and applies it in a non-arbitrary manner. These are expressions of institutional conscience that are centrally and openly concerned with
ultimate justice. In order to preserve the credibility and reputation of the court, the judges who write these opinions are willing to
take their fellow panelists to task for any perceived shortcomings
in the fulfillment of the obligations of the role. So, for example,
Judge Jones wrote:

113. Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 375 (11th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)
("This is the moral burden we bear when we defer consideration of a petition for the Great
Writ. This burden cannot possibly be supported by considerations of judicial economy and
efficiency; an Atlas, not an Anchises, of a justification is needed to shoulder the burdens of
the rule of complete exhaustion. A judge's time is precious, to be sure, but precious only in
relation to the tasks the judge performs. In a habeas corpus case, we are dealing with
human life and human liberty, precious commodities even in today's world of depreciated
traditional values. I will not participate in the process of depreciating further human life
and liberty by accepting the proposition that saving an hour or two of a judge's time justifies keeping a man locked behind the bars of a state penitentiary for a year or more.").
114. United States v. Corona, 661 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1981) (Sneed, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
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In this context, confidence in the outcome of Byrd's trial must
be, and is, seriously undermined. One cannot, in good conscience, blink at such substantial constitutional impropriety
with full comprehension of its deadly effects. In these circumstances, judicial neglect transforms the justice system into an
accomplice to constitutional transgression.1 1 6
Along similar lines of underscoring the reality of the final significance of these decisions, but adding a particular concern for keeping within proper bounds, giving deference to the proper decisionmaker on a given issue, Judge Heaney wrote in dissent:
Had the jury been apprised of Lingar's life circumstances,
there exists a reasonable probability that it would have found
mitigating circumstances to outweigh aggravating circumstances and therefore would have voted for life imprisonment.
Because I cannot in good consciencejoin in the majority's certainty that this information would have made no difference to
the question of whether Stanley David Lingar should be put to
death by the state, I respectfully dissent."'
Along similar lines, a number of judges take opportunities to
speak directly to the importance of full review or full process that
ought to be (or ought to have been) afforded on a particular question, and the reality of the circumstances that can make it important to get it right in the first instance. Often they speak of
these concerns in terms of institutional conscience, especially in
the context of dissents from denials of rehearing en banc, further
discussed below.118
On the theme of potentially unjust outcomes, and the matters of
judicial conscience that can play into them, some cases display
judicial efforts to underscore the need for open acknowledgment
that those before the court are real people suffering real consequences. The Getsy case quoted above offers an example of a judicial reminder that these are real people facing real (and final) effects."' The dissenting opinion there urged judges to be careful to
remember and carefully consider the practical effects of their rulings, rather than seeing them in the abstract or as "hypothetical
116.
added).
117.
118.
119.

Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 548 (6th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J., dissenting) (emphasis
Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453, 466 (8th Cir. 1999) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
See discussion infra Section III.G.
Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 327 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., dissenting).
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players in a criminal law final exam."12 0 Along similar lines,
sometimes a judge will, as a matter of institutional conscience,
note either what that judge believes to be a lack of credibility in
the majority's interpretation or specific application of the lawthat the court is imposing a meaning that does not make sense as
a practical matter,'2 1 or imposing a burden that is unrealistic.'2 2
Such references to judicial conscience again may be intended to
speak to concerns about the development and maintenance of public confidence essential to the legitimacy of judicial decisions.
It is not always in dissents that these expressions of institutional conscience occur with regard to the effort to maintain the credibility and reputation of the court. Majority opinions on issues of
due process, for instance, often afford opportunities for matters of
conscience to come into the analysis for the benefit of the court's
credibility. Writing for the majority in one death penalty case,
Judge Rawlinson concluded: "We simply cannot in good conscience continue to send men to their deaths without ensuring that
their cases were not prejudiced by inadequate legal representation
at any phase of the proceedings."12 3 It is noteworthy that this
statement appeared in the context of a case that drew separate
opinions from each of the three judges on the panel.'2 4 Judge
120. Id.
121. See In re Ruffalo, 370 F.2d 447, 461 (6th Cir. 1966) (Edwards, J., dissenting) ("I
cannot in good conscience agree that the making of such small loans as these to two admittedly impoverished widows represented purchasing an interest in litigation"), rev'd, 390
U.S. 544 (1968) (reversing on grounds for lack of notice to attorney that disbarment was a
potential ramification for the offense).
122. See United States v. Corona, 661 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1981) (Sneed, J., dissenting) ("This decision, however, will not deter officers who find themselves in a position similar to that in which Officer Wolfe found himself in this case. Nor should it. Officers so
situated will not risk being slain on a back street because of this decision nor can I in good
conscience ask them to assume such risks. The incidence of murdered policemen is too high
to dismiss the risk lightly. The depth of my feeling can be evidenced by my affirmation that
had I been Officer Wolfe I too would have stopped and conducted a pat-down search of the
appellant.") (emphasis added). Courts may show a similar conscientious concern for others
within their own branch but playing different roles. So, for example, one appellate judge
dissented in conscientious objection to the unhelpful standard the court would impose on
the lower courts. See Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1966) (Kaufman, J., dissenting) ("Since my brothers agree that it is difficult to see any real distinctions
between cases where the stevedore lost and those where he won . .. I cannot, in good conscience, become a party to simply an exercise in skillful rhetoric-and inflict on the district
court the impossible task of dealing with words and phrases that are like beads of quicksilver.") (citations omitted).
123. Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
124. In concurrence, Judge Fletcher did not speak to any issues of conscience, but rather
took up other issues of legal interpretation relating to the claims that were affirmed. Id. at
626-28 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
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Kleinfeld took a relatively detached and pragmatic view in his
part-concurrence, part-dissent. Emphasizing the limited and discretionary nature of federal evidentiary hearings on state habeas
petitions, he walked carefully through a very practical assessment
of why, on the facts of the case, it makes sense that their review
should be limited and discretionary.12 5 Responding to the dissent,
however, despite the dissent's lack of any reference to conscience,
morality, or any other personal response to the case before the
panel, the majority further explained its position:
There is no doubt that the facts of this case are repulsive. But

that is true for every case where the death penalty is imposed.
If the resolution of this case rested on the relative heinousness of the offense, we would have no quarrel with our colleague in dissent. However, our charge is to look at the merits
of the legal issues raised rather than to focus on the degree to
which we are repulsed by the inevitably grisly details of the

case.126
Here, the judge writing for the majority is careful to indicate an
understanding of the realities of the situation, the significance of
the majority's decision, and how it may look in ordinary human
terms. However, the greater weight goes, as the majority opinion
shows, to the legal requirements that must constrain the court's
decision-making. The acknowledgement and the transparency of
the reasoning in all three opinions in this case may well be quite
helpful to readers seeking to understand the law, the outcome,
and the reasoning process used by the judges, such that it may
improve confidence in that decision-making process and in its results.
The examples in this section demonstrate a basic matter of conscientious judicial concern for the credibility and reputation of the
courts. These are expressions of conscience that make clear the
judicial commitment to be honest and transparent in their decision-making process, to be clear-sighted about (and not too detached from) the "real life" significance of the decisions they make,
and to have a properly restrained understanding and practice with
regard to their own power and authority. These conscientious ef125.
sizing
scores
126.

Id. at 628 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (further emphathe fact that so much time passed before anyone asked for a hearing, which underthe fairness issue).
Id. at 616 (Rawlinson, J., majority opinion) (emphasis added).
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forts should bolster public confidence in the judiciary as trustees
of the law.
G.

Dissents From Denials of Rehearing En Banc

One last category of expressions of specifically institutional conscience, with an eye firmly fixed on the judicial role itself, and the
role of the judiciary more broadly as an important player in the
legal system, is that of dissents from denials of rehearing en banc.
These are often focused on matters not necessarily tied to a specific case, but tied instead to what a rule made or applied in a certain case may mean more broadly for future obligations of the
courts at various levels. The concerns in this category of institutional concern range from resource allocation and timing issues, to
the practical workings of procedures, to concern for the reputation
of the law or the justice system as a whole, to concern for the legitimacy of the judiciary in recognizing evolving standards over time,
and so on. It is true that sometimes these opinions simply reflect
a different view of the law and do so in a relatively straightforward manner,12 7 and some though straightforward take perhaps a
more urgent tone,'28 but still others do speak directly to the larger
issue of the conscientious obligation owed by a whole court in
providing review of decisions by panels of its members and the
attendant stability and finality of that kind of review. So, for example, Judge Reinhardt, joined by Judge Pregerson, wrote in dissent (excerpted here at length due to the depth of relevant analysis) in a death penalty case, explaining the many layers of conscientious responsibility of the judiciary:
Preliminarily, I think it important to discuss briefly one aspect of our en banc process and its relationship to the public's
right to be fully informed on the subject of capital punishment. The en banc process allows the full court the opportunity to decide whether a three-judge decision upholding a death
sentence correctly construes the Constitution and correctly
127. See, e.g., Cammack v. Waihee, 944 F.2d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 1991) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (discussing the issue of whether
Good Friday can be considered a secular holiday).
128. Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 304-313 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) ("This case illustrates the costs to the legal
system when compassion displaces law. The panel majority says it is not too late for justice
to be done. But we administer justice according to law. Justice in a larger sense, justice
according to morality, is for Congress and the President to administer, if they see fit,
through the creation of new law.").
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applies controlling legal precedent. Yet, under our court rules,
when a suggestion that the court hear a case en banc is rejected we do not announce the division. All we say is that a
majority of the non-recused active judges failed to vote in favor of such a hearing. That tells the public little. We do not
reveal whether the vote was close or even whether a majority
of the eligible judges voted against en banc review. Whatever
the wisdom of that rule in general-and I believe the answer is
that the rule is wrong under all circumstances-it clearly does
not serve the public interest in death penalty cases.
I believe the people have a right to know if an individual is being executed notwithstanding the fact that a substantial
number of judges who have examined the constitutionality of
the state's proposed action believe further judicial review is
necessary-and I believe that there is no justification for concealing the actual division in the court. There are good reasons why history should fully record the judicial votes in
death penalty cases.
One of the continuing questions regarding both the propriety
and constitutionality of the death penalty is whether it is arbitrary. Can the death penalty be applied in a manner that
clearly and objectively separates those who should be put to
death from those who are allowed to live? Is the law so clearly
discernible that men and women of good will can in good conscience say-yes, a fair-minded individual would necessarily
determine that the law classifies this case as one in which the
taking of the defendant's life is proper? If such an objective
classification cannot be made, should we not continue to question seriously the fairness and legitimacy of the process, and
its application in particular cases? .

.

. Arbitrariness in the

application of the death penalty is neither an abstract nor a
closed subject. . . . Many jurists and otherpersons sensitive to
individual rights believe that McCleskey's execution was legally indefensible and morally unconscionable. Others simply argue that the determination that McCleskey should die was
based on so uncertain and questionable a legal foundation
that, at the very least, serious questions are raised as to
whether the death penalty is being enforced in an arbitrary
manner....
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En banc review is a critical safeguard in the capital punishment process. Ordinary concerns regardingjudicial administration should not influence our judgment whether to grant
further review to death penalty decisions that may be flawed
by substantial errors of law. We have a special responsibility

in death penalty cases to see that the Constitution and applicable statutes are fully complied with. There is no margin for
error. In capital punishment appeals, neitherjudicial or administrative convenience nor any other reason can justify our

deferring to the views of a three-judge panel if the majority of
the court might, after further study, conclude that the conviction or sentence is unlawful. When a human life is at stake, we

should provide en banc review in all cases in which legitimate
questions exist concerning a panel's decision in favor of the
state. Harris most certainly qualifies under that standard, as
he would under any reasonable test. Common decency and
fairness-as well as due process-requirethat we rehear his case
en banc. . . . I deeply regret that we have decided otherwise.1 29

In this case, as in other examples that will follow, there is persistent and direct attention given to conscientious institutional responsibility as a matter of the very procedure at issue. Petitions
for rehearing en banc get most basically at the question of whether a panel has properly adhered to the law, has exercised its authority properly, fulfilled its obligations-in short whether, in
their role of exercising judgment, they have gotten the result
right. This is the kind of question that lies at the true core of the
appellate judicial role, and thus the reasoning courts engage in
when deciding whether to grant a rehearing very often explicitly
draws on institutional conscience, as exemplified in Judge Reinhardt's opinion here. That conscientious commitment runs both to
the larger picture of the place of rehearings en banc in the shape
of the judicial task and to the particular procedure and outcome in
this case. The judge shows significant concern for both.
Furthermore, one sees here a judge conscientiously committed
to ensuring that the right process is used in getting to a just result, a judge committed to consideration of public appearance and
perspective on issues involving significant moral questions relevant to society as a whole, to value issues of life and death over
129.

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1539-45 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting

from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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administrative or resource-based concerns of the institution, and
one sees all of this expressed as something that is felt deeply by
Judge Reinhardt as an individual occupant of the role (along with
Judge Pregerson, who joined the opinion). Here we see both plural and singular pronouns, both references to core commitments of
the institution (such as the need for due process) and references to
the judge's personal views on common decency and fairness, including references to his own beliefs and regrets. 3 0 He takes this
matter personally, as well as professionally.131
Furthermore, to show the variety of perspectives on institutional conscience and how it may play into the decision-making, Judge
Alarcon wrote a shorter dissent in the same case, also making reference to conscience, but focused on a different institutional commitment:
I decline to participate further in the unconscionable delays
that have occurred in reaching a final determination in this
matter. It is no wonder that Congress is presently reexamining the rules that permit state prisoners to seek federal habeas corpus relief. The Harris case is a textbook example of how
the Great Writ can be abused.' 3 2
Along similar lines, challenging the majority of the court as to
the institutional responsibility of the court with regard to finding
the right balance on matters of timing, in another case Judge
Reinhardt launched another part-concurrence-part-dissent by saying:
I dissent from this court's refusal to stay Campbell's execution
by hanging pending his filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Our denial of
Campbell's request for a stay is in direct violation of the rules
that govern the operation of this court. By our decision we
pronounce our willingness to hang Campbell first and submit
the serious constitutional issue he raises to the Supreme
130. See also Novak v. Beto, 456 F.2d 1303, 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) ("With deep distress and profound
regret I note the refusal of a majority of the members of this Court to give en banc consideration to this case.").
131. For further discussion of intertwined expressions of institutional and personal
conscience, see infra Section V.
132. Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (Alarcon, J., dissenting from
denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (emphasis added).
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Court for decision later. So the Ninth Circuit returns, at least
for now, to the rough Western justice of frontier days: Hang
'em first, ask questions later.1 33
Similar concerns of judicial conscience with regard to timing issues, as well as issues about the need for full process and thus full
review of death penalty cases in an en banc context were expressed in a concurrence and a dissent in a Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals case. Judge Moore, in concurrence, reiterated the
unconscionability of the application of controlling law on timing
grounds, because it had the effect of permitting the appellant's
execution to go forward "without ever having the opportunity to
have a court consider the merits of his Eighth Amendment challenge to his method of execution, a method that a court may well
find unconstitutional just a few short months following his death
by lethal injection."1 34 Judge Merritt, in dissent from the denial of
rehearing en banc, also called the holding unconscionable in its
expansion of the law, but explained in different terms: "The court's
deceptive attempt to say that some unknown, undescribed future
case might not be time barred, if the challenged alterations are
sufficiently egregious, improperly conflates the merits of the case
with the statute of limitations, and is not even consistent with the
Cooey II case or any other case in the legal canon.""' These examples of both pragmatic concerns and more technical concerns
about proper compliance with governing law show the variety of
ways in which judicial conscience may come into play even within
the same opinion, especially when rehearing en banc, and thus the
clarification and settlement of a difficult issue of law, is at stake.
H.

Conclusions on Expressionsof InstitutionalConscience

Expressions of true institutional conscience provide important
added value to the readers of appellate judicial opinions, wherever
they are placed. Coming as they do from a uniquely informed perspective, and providing as they do a glimpse of the deeply felt concern for the responsibility embodied in the judicial role, they afford both useful input into the decision-making process and also a
133. Campbell 11, 20 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The specific reference to judicial conscience in this opinion is
discussed infra Section V.A.
134. Getsy v. Strickland, 577 F.3d 320, 321 (6th Cir. 2009) (Moore, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 321-22 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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transparency that can enhance public confidence in the careful,
thoughtful work of the judiciary. This value is only added, however, in situations in which there really is a matter worthy of conscientious concern, rather than routine practice. If conscience were
to be overplayed as a matter of institutional responsibility, it
would lose its force for purposes of promoting public confidence.
Given the relative rarity with which federal appellate judges make
these explicit references to conscientious concerns, however, overuse does not appear to be a problem.
IV. EXPRESSIONS OF PERSONAL CONSCIENCE
A.

Basic Themes

Turning to cases in which the focus of the expression of judicial
conscience is a personal, rather than an institutional commitment,
things look somewhat different. As noted earlier, the use of the
pronoun "I" or "we" is not dispositive in the determination of
whether a judge's expression is primarily personal or institutional.
One must look to the context, content, and tone of a statement of
conscience in order to assess whether it fits into the personal or
institutional category."' Judges and commentators have weighed
in on both sides of the propriety question in this arena. Given
that it happens, however, that judges do sometimes resort to personal conscientious commitments and at times openly express
those commitments in their written opinions, either in support of
or against the relevant legal consideration, it is important to examine the concerns that are at issue in these instances.
Where the expressions are about truly personal matters of conscience, as opposed to mixed matters of personal and institutional
commitments, there is usually an accompanying expression of the
judge's straightforward opposition to the policy behind a given

law. Statements expressing personal conscientious commitments
do occur in other contexts, but they often walk a fine line between
the truly personal and what may just as easily be understood as a
deeply-felt commitment to institutional responsibility that comes
136. See., e.g., Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 1991) (Altimari, J.,
dissenting) (using "I"in conscientious statements about judicial responsibility with regard
to substantive content of Due Process clause); United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 24243 (5th Cir. 1978) (Coleman, J., concurring) (stating disagreement with decision about
responsibility of courts in terms of personal experience with how they work); United States
ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 428 F.2d 623, 639 (8th Cir. 1970) (Lay, J., dissenting) (acknowledging personal perspective on what the law contemplates or is meant to afford).
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across as personal due to a basic disagreement, or difference in
perspective, from those in the majority."' That muddy middle
ground will be discussed further in the next section.13 1
B.

Concurrencesas Outlets for ExpressionAlone

Examples of truly personal conscience coming into play to express an individual judge's opposition to the state of the law, or its
application in a given case, appear in both concurrences and dissents. They do not always indicate an intention to subvert the
law; they are often simply outlets for a judge to state the disagreement, while still acting within the bounds of the law and of
the judicial role. In such instances, the effect is much like what
was seen in the institutional conscience cases relating to adherence to precedent that a judge found undesirable. The difference
is that the expression is more clearly a matter of personal judgment as opposed to institutional responsibility. So, for example,
Judge Craven wrote in a concurrence on a sentencing matter:
I would dissent ... but for Peterson.... I think this outmoded decision, decided wrongly before I was born, is binding up-

on a panel of our court. I would en banc the case, overrule Peterson, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.
I am very strongly of the opinion that a trial judge may not
properly impose a harsher sentence upon a defendant because
he thinks the defendant lied on the witness stand. Such a
practice will inevitably chill and hamper, if not ultimately destroy, the right to testify in one's own defense. It seems to me
unconscionable that a defendant must run the risk of convic137. One example here is that of the judge who sees the majority improperly extending a
doctrine beyond the extent warranted. See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 19-20 (1st
Cir. 2007) (Stahl, J., dissenting) ("It was said by Edmund Burke, 'The true danger is when
liberty is nibbled away, for expedients, and by parts.' I cannot, in good conscience, sign on
to a decision that I believe provides the legal rationale for an enormous expansion of state
intrusion into the most private of realms, without warrant, probable cause, or even suspicion."). Here the first person pronoun was used and the conscientious commitment was
clearly strongly felt by the judge as an individual. However, the basis for the conscientious
commitment was arguably institutional rather than truly personal. Along similar lines, see
Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 79 (3d Cir. 2004) (Ambro, J., dissenting) ("I cannot in
good conscience bury Schlueter's case before it sees the light of day. AEDPA confers on
federal courts the authority equitably to toll its limitations period in the interest of justice.
If any case is ripe for exercise of that power, this one is. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.").
138. See discussion infra Section V.
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tion of the offense charged and at the same time run the
gauntlet of disbelief.'

This shows us a judge who insists on preserving propriety in playing the judicial role, recognizing the binding authority of existing
case law that will not permit a dissent in good faith, adhering to
the responsibility of the role, but who takes the opportunity of
writing separately to point out what he sees as being wrong with
the substance and operation of that law.
Judge Coleman, along similar lines, concurred in a Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals case, United States v. Scruggs,14 0 to state his conscientious objection to the giving of Allen charges,"'1 recognizing
that although they are firmly established in the law, his own experience as a trial judge taught him that they are not a good idea
in practice.14 2 He wrote: "At the risk, however, of being accused of
an attempt to fight lost battles all over again, I must, in good conscience, again state my long-held opposition to the use of the Allen
charge . . . ."s

Th18 said, to be clear about the relationship be-

tween his own conscience and the force of the actual state of the
law, Judge Coleman concluded, "Nothing I have said is to be construed as a criticism of the trial judge. He acted well within the
law as it presently stands in this Circuit.""
Judge Coleman does not stand alone in feeling compelled by
personal conscience to speak up, despite well-entrenched legal authority that may stand against the legal issue in question. Like
the personal experience that drove Judge Coleman in Scruggs,
quite often what seems to drive these types of statements of personal conscience are matters that hit close to home with judges as
matters of personal experience or individual understandings of
morality, credibility, or justice. A few examples will demonstrate
the pull of personal conscientious commitment or responsibility to
speak up for what they see as right. For instance, Judge Van
Graafeiland wrote in a concurring opinion:
139. United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1288 (4th Cir. 1973) (Craven, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
140. 583 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978) (Coleman, J., concurring).
141. An "Allen charge," named after the case of Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492
(1896), is effectively a direction from the trial judge to a jury to continue deliberations to
avoid a mistrial.
142. Scruggs, 583 F.2d at 242-43 (Coleman, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 242. The judge went on to paint the particular circumstances in the instant
case that amplified the problems he saw with the Allen charge more generally. Id. at 243.
144. Id. at 243.
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I concur in this case with great reluctance and wish that I
could do otherwise. It seems unconscionable to me that this

seventy-four year old widow who lived with Joseph Thomas
for forty-seven years and bore ten of his children is now to be
branded an adulteress, with whatever ramifications to her
and her children that may result from this adjudication. See
Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting). However, we must apply the law
as Congress wrote it, not as we would like to have had it writ-

ten. 145
In this instance, the judge shows a respectful restraint in playing
the judicial role, writing in concurrence to draw attention to the
issue, but not trying to change the outcome or abdicate the judicial
responsibility of applying the law as written. Along similar lines,
underscoring considerations of practical fairness, Judge Will dissented in a trust law case, writing:
Given the uncontested facts found by the District Court, my
reading of Texas trust law and my understanding of the role
of a federal appellate court, I would affirm, remanding only to
permit appellees to be reimbursed for any out-of-pocket expenses they incurred with respect to the Dyckman property. I
cannot in good conscience join in a decision which will reward
perfidy and breach of trust with more than $270,000, an
amount which, even in Texas, must be substantial."'
This demonstrates the way in which real life effects on the people
before them can become matters of personal conscientious concern
and commitment for individual judges who may, in rare instances,
simply not be able to reconcile themselves to the practical outcomes dictated by the law. A remedies case showing similar concerns addressed it in terms of "judicial conscience," "human conscience," and "considerable grief" (the last of which must surely
mark it out as fitting clearly in the personal conscience category).
This was a matter the judge truly took to heart. Judge Goldberg
wrote in concurrence:

145. Thomas v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1990) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
146. Harris v. Sentry Title Co., 715 F.2d 941, 961 (5th Cir. 1983) (Will, J., dissenting).
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It is with considerablegrief that I write to specially concur in
the result denying punitive damages against the City of Houston. I fully concur in the majority opinion on all other issues,
but must specially concur on the issue of punitive damages
because the majority suggests that City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc. might allow punitive damages against a municipality in a section 1983 suit if the facts were particularly
egregious. Would that it were so, for then I could, with clear
judicial conscience, urge taxing the City of Houston with punitive damages. If there were any narrow gap around Newport
for an egregious case, this one would slip through; I am
aghast at the thought that any violation of constitutional
rights more appalling, more threatening than the one that occurred here might actually exist. Sadly, I view Newport as
presenting an impenetrable barrier to punitive damages.
Would that it were not so, for now I must, with troubled human conscience, concur in this unfortunate result.4 7
Here again, the human conscience may be troubled and grieved at
a level that requires the judge to express that conscientious disagreement with the law, but the judicial conscience restrains the
judge from dissenting without legal grounds to do so.148
C.

Dissenting to Express and Follow PersonalConscience

Another few cases will add to this picture the contrast between
expressions of personal conscience placed in concurrences and
those in dissents. For example, in a case about negligence liability
under the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
("LHWCA"), Judge Selya (who called it a "close and vexing case")
wrote in a concurring opinion:
This reasoning leads me to conclude, with all respect, either
that Congress inadvertently muddied the waters in phrasing
LHWCA § 905(b), or, alternatively, that Jones & Laughlin
was wrongly decided. Still, I recognize that the Supreme
Court's opinion is binding on this court, and that we therefore
must undertake what Judge Campbell charitably terms "an
147. Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1230-31 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
148. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MA'ITER OF PRINCIPLE 3 (1985) ("Even in hard cases,
though judges enforce their own convictions about matters of principle, they need not and
characteristically do not enforce their own opinions about wise policy.").
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elusive quest." Ante at note 11. Once reconciled to that necessity, I can in good conscience join this court's cogent opinion. I

write separately, however, to urge the Supreme Court and
Congress to reflect upon the mind games that Jones & Laughlin-particularly as applied to harbor workers-compels us to
play, and, hopefully, to revisit the question of whether "dual
capacity" employers should be liable at all in negligence actions brought by their employees."'
Strong feeling like this is something that often prompts dissents,
which brings us back once more to the examples noted at the outset of the paper, perhaps some of the clearest and most direct
statements of purely personal conscientious objection to the application of pertinent law. In the three cases of Rico v. Terhune,so
Wallace v. Castro,"' and Turner v. Candelaria,"2 all of which

came before the same three-judge panel on the Ninth Circuit, the
three-strikes law was at issue. In each case, the majority opinion
was denoted in a memorandum opinion. In each case there was a
very brief concurrence by Judge Reinhardt, who wrote only: "I
concur only under compulsion of the Supreme Court decision in
Andrade. I believe the sentence is both unconscionable and unconstitutional." This demonstrates quite simply and straightforwardly both Judge Reinhardt's conscientious commitment to stay within the bounds of the role in deciding cases according to controlling
law and also his personal conscientious view that the substance of
the law is wrong.'53 Furthermore, in each case there was an even
briefer dissent by Judge Pregerson, who wrote only: "In good conscience, I can't vote to go along with the sentence imposed in this
case.""' Without further legal reasoning, this comes across as a
149. Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, JN, 97 F.3d 603, 616 (1st Cir. 1996) (Selya, J., concurring). Judge Cyr, in his dissenting opinion in the same case, did not himself use the
word "conscience" but implicitly contrasted his own view, using instead the term of "fundamental disagreement" to express the basis for his dissent from the court's following of the
applicable Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 616 (Cyr, J., dissenting) ("As I am in fundamental disagreement with the treatment given the duties of care incumbent upon dual
capacity LHWCA employers by the en banc court under the Supreme Court decision in
Scindia, I respectfully dissent."). This shows an equally strong feeling, albeit without
choosing to pick up on "conscience" as a specific term.
150. 63 F. App'x 394 (9th Cir. 2003).
151. 65 F. App'x 618 (9th Cir. 2003).
152. 64 F. App'x 647 (9th Cir. 2003).
153. Rico, 63 F. App'x at 394 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); Wallace, 65 F. App'x at 619
(Reinhardt, J., concurring); Turner, 64 F. App'x at 648 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
154. Rico, 63 F. App'x at 394 (Pregerson, J., dissenting); Wallace, 65 F. App'x at 619
(Pregerson, J., dissenting); Turner, 64 F. App'x at 648 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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purely personal aversion to the content and the effect of the applicable law.
What makes these separate opinions in the three-strikes cases
all the more intriguing is that they were written in cases that
were all unanimously determined by the panel to be fit for decision without oral argument, and they were not selected for official
publication. This raises some significant questions about the
point or the rhetorical force of the statements of conscience, and at
the same time offers a scenario in which the statements of conscience might be shown to be (as a purely practical matter) harmless and therefore less problematic. If nothing else, it underscores
the reality that the judges involved accepted that the law was
well-settled, and that they knew they were not adding anything
new to the conversation (such that publication would be required),
and yet the pull of personal conscience was so strong that they did
feel compelled to express that conscientious objection on the record.
As these last few examples have demonstrated, personal conscientious objection to the substance of the law can sometimes form
the basis for the practice of repeated dissents."' In fact, several
examples have already come up in this discussion."
The added
weight of repeated dissents and the overt reference to them by the
judges writing them, especially where they are based on adherence to personal opposition to established law, is open to question.
On the one hand, they serve purposes that may be of value to the
institution as a whole. They can serve as signals to other courts,
to litigants, to the other branches, and so on, about issues on
which there is deeply felt concern from one with the benefit of the
judicial perspective, which may gain added weight for the fact that
they have persisted over time. On the other hand, they may be
harmful to the perception of the judiciary as less than fully openminded on a given point, or as insufficiently committed to the application of the law as it is, rather than the law as that individual
judge would prefer it to be. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
155. Allison Orr Larsen, PerpetualDissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 447 (2008).
156. For example, Judge Van Graafeiland, in Thomas v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 139 (2d
Cir. 1990) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) noted his own prior dissent in Grey v. Heckler,
721 F.2d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). Along similar lines, but
repeating a concurrence rather than a dissent, Judge Coleman, as he noted in his concurrence in United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 242 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (Coleman, J., concurring), had previously expressed the same position in concurrences in both United States
v. Bailey, 480 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. 1973) (Coleman, J., concurring) and Thaggard v.
United States, 354 F.2d 735, 739-40 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J., concurring).
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address these issues specific to repeated dissents, but whatever
the answers to these questions, judicial conscience must certainly
play into them.
D.

Conclusions on PersonalConscience

Expressions of personal conscience may have some legitimate
role to play, especially in concurring opinions, but one might still
argue that no judicial opinion can ever be purely an expression of
personal conscience, simply by virtue of the fact that it occurs in a
judicial opinion. There is something about the mere fact of remaining in the role, rather than recusing or resigning, that might
be taken as an indication that the individual judge sees the expression of personal conscientious commitment to be itself an appropriate fulfillment of at least certain aspects of the responsibilities of the judicial role. This idea of overlap and interplay is
brought to the fore in a rather muddy middle ground in which judicial opinions show intertwined references to both institutional
and personal conscience.
V. THE MIDDLE GROUND: INTERTWINED PERSONAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE

A.

Intertwined Usage

One might argue that no judge ever writes anything in an official opinion without some comment, express or implied, about the
institutional responsibility of the judge, and no judge can write
anything as an individual without there being some aspect of personal conscientious commitment to what he or she writes. Even
so, as the last two sections of this article have explored, there are
some expressions of conscience that are more dominated by institutional concerns, and other expressions that appeal more to personal than institutional conscience. However, there is also a middle category in which the personal and the institutional conscience
are put forward with roughly equal force. Very often, for reasons
that will be explored as we go along, these examples come up in
cases having to do with liberty issues and matters of life and
death, to be more precise in death penalty cases. A few excerpts
will reveal the complexities of the overlap of conscientious concerns in several such cases.
A death penalty case in the Ninth Circuit brought before a
three-judge panel a question (among others) of the constitutionali-
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ty of hanging as a method of execution. In the initial panel opinion, Judge Reinhardt, writing in part-concurrence, part-dissent,
expressed a closely intertwined combination of personal and institutional conscientious commitments, as follows:
In the absence of a judicial stay, the State of Washington is
likely to hang Campbell before the Supreme Court even has
an opportunity to decide whether hanging is constitutional.
Today's order, refusing to exercise the authority and responsibility that is vested in us by our rules, demonstrates the majority's willingness to allow this unconscionable course of events
to unfold. . . . I recognize that our refusal to act in accordance
with law does not mean that Campbell will necessarily be executed before he can file his petition for writ of certiorari in
the Supreme Court or before that Court can fully consider his
constitutional claim. Justice O'Connor, our Circuit Justice,
can issue a stay if she is so inclined, or the full Court can do
so if five Justices vote to grant a stay. However, that should
not ease the conscience of any member of this court or serve as
an excuse for anyone's failure to perform his or her duty
properly. We could say in any case that comes before us:
"What difference does it make whether we follow the law? The
Supreme Court can undo whatever we do or fail to do." No
self-respectingjurist would take that position in the ordinary
case. It would be even less acceptable to do so here. A court
that respects the rule of law must adhere to its obligationand
do its duty.m
When there was later a proposal for the court to rehear the case
en banc, again Judge Reinhardt dissented in part, this time at
great length, including arguments such as these:
Hanging is, without the slightest doubt, "cruel and unusual"in layman's terms and in the constitutional sense. No other
answer is consistent with our claim to be an enlightened and
civilized nation. In Anno Domini 1994, when almost every
state and most other nations have rejected such a savage and
barbaric method of killing its citizens, no court could in good
conscience say that hanging comports with our "evolving
standards of decency." It is inconceivable to me that in one
157. Campbell II, 20 F.3d 1050, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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corner of our vast and proud country, a single judicial circuit
is willing to violate its constitutionalobligations and permit
this unconscionable and long outmoded practice to exist. In a

time when public fear of crime and violence is high, it may be
understandable that some judges will on occasion close their
eyes to the dictates of the Constitution, and employ whatever
form of rationalization or self-deception will lead them to the
result they deem expedient. . . . [T]he majority's decision to
disregard all relevant Supreme Court precedent is simply in-

explicable. Still, democracy has proved resilient and our Constitution has grown stronger as time has passed, notwithstanding temporary setbacks at the hands of courts motivated
on occasion by political objectives. It has grown stronger in
part because the judiciary on the whole has proved to be courageous, independent, and fair minded. The courts have usually corrected their own sins and errors long before they became

irremediable. In this case, as in others, the Constitution will
ultimately emerge unscathed. It is only this court that will be
diminished by what the majority does today. Until we reverse
today's decision, our circuit will have a blotch on its reputation that will be a constant embarrassment to us all. I hope

that before long we will be able to comprehend what has for
some time been apparent to most of the rest of the civilized
world. . . . Without question, and despite the decision of my
colleagues, hanging violates the Constitution. I dissent.'
There is a great deal going on in this excerpt-much of it selfexplanatory-but there are several points to be drawn out in particular to add to the understanding of how judges themselves view
the role of their conscientious commitments to both the institution
and their personal integrity in their decision-making. There is
concern for the reputation of the institution,5"' concern for fidelity
to constitutional obligations, concern for getting the law right over
time, and concern for restraint from acting politically (i.e., beyond
the proper scope of the role), all of which are most clearly matters
of conscientious commitment to the institution. There is also concern for courage, concern for deference to an ordinary sense of
what is right, and concern for the practical realities of human con158. Campbell I, 18 F.3d 662, 716-17 (9th Cir.) (Reinhardt, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added), reh'g denied, 20 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
159. See discussion supra Section III.F.
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cerns (in the use of words like "savage" and "barbaric"), all of
which might fit more naturally into the category of personal conscience. 6 o
With equal feeling albeit at somewhat lesser length, in two partconcurrences part-dissents (using identical language in each),
Judge Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit spoke to institutional conscience with regard to due process problems, emphasizing the unfortunate practical result of the majority approach, but also added
a reference to personal prayer, surely the most personal of references or resorts to conscience:
This unconscionable result violates due process by forcing
children either to suffer de facto expulsion from the country of
their birth or forego their constitutionally-protected right to
remain in this country with their family intact.... As I have
said before, "I pray that soon the good men and women in our
Congress will ameliorate the plight of families like the [petitioner's] and give us humane laws that will not cause the disintegration of such families.""'1
The judge was perfectly transparent, first about basing his opinion
firmly on due process grounds, and second about the depth of his
personal concern about getting the law right in this particular area due to what he saw as its inhumane effects. He even used the
arguably heightened language of prayer to make his point about
the importance of getting it right, which points beyond merely institutional to deeply-felt personal ideals of justice.
In another case on the same immigration issue, Judge
Pregerson omitted the reference to prayer, but retained the statement about the unconscionability of the result.1 62 Intriguingly, the
majority opinion in that case responded to Judge Pregerson's position as follows:
Despite our conclusion, we agree with the sentiments expressed
in the dissent. This is an unfortunate outcome in a sympathet-

160. There is also a depth of potential implied meaning in the use of the phrase "Anno
Domini" where one might have simply used the word "year." Whether this is intended to
conjure up specifically the judge's own conscientious commitment to Christian dogma must
remain purely conjectural, but it is an intriguing reference.
161. Benitez v. Mukasey, 270 F. App'x 523, 525-26 (9th Cir. 2008) (Pregerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Gonzales v.
Keisler, 251 F. App'x 435, 436 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
162. Carranza v. Holder, 356 F. App'x 61, 63 (9th Cir. 2009) (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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ic case. To remove a single mother of three who has lawfully
lived and worked in the United States for two decades, despite the family upheaval and separation that it will entail, is
"unconscionable,"see Dissent at 62; that this pro se petitioner
has been unable to obtain review of the BIA's decision to deny
relief because of procedural errors is also unfair. However, the
result we reach is dictated by existing law and does not, as a
matter of law, violate the Due Process Clause. 163
This suggests that the conscience that was offended here is purely
personal, and that institutional conscience (if such a thing exists
at all in the view of the majority) is entirely a matter of following
the dictates of existing law. To further complicate the picture
about what messages may have been intended in all of these
statements, all three of these immigration cases were decided
without oral argument, and none of the three were selected for
official publication, indicating both that the court does not see
them as making a new or notable contribution to the corpus of the
law, and restricting their citation back to the court as authority in
later matters. For all this expression of conscientious feeling
about getting the law right, there is also an aspect of keeping these expressions under certain wraps which may suggest even more
strongly that the judges ultimately view these as personal, and
even perhaps futile, matters of disagreement, not really intended
for public use or consumption.
Often these cases of intertwined conscientious commitments appear in cases whose facts, like those in the deportation and death
penalty examples, pull especially strongly on human emotions.
Judge Torruella, in a dissenting opinion drawing on both his personal conscientious reaction to the facts of the case and also his
commitment to the conscientious responsibility of the institution,
wrote as follows:
The specter of an adult, particularly one in a position of trust
such as a stepfather, sexually abusing his minor stepchildren
is enough to incense even the most equanimous person and to
wish upon such a miscreant the full retributive weight of the
law. But there lies the catch: the law. We live in an ordered
society, and to keep it ordered for the benefit of the whole of society, we are bound to apply the law, not just to do what we be163. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
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lieve the abominable person charged may justly deserve....

Because I cannot in good conscience find that the trial court's
ruling in this case reasonably applied established federal law
when considering the petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights
and because the court engaged in no perceptible balancing of
the considerations required under White, I am forced to conclude that the petitioner in this case is entitled to the habeas
relief he seeks."
Similarly, in a Sixth Circuit case approving the lower court's requirement of a GPS tracking device for a sex offender, Judge Keith
dissented, with what appears to be a combination of personal and
institutional conscience. He wrote:
Because our Circuit has foreclosed Doe's argument with respect to the Registration Act, . . . I concur with the majority's

dismissal of this claim. However, as to the Surveillance Act, I
strongly disagree with the majority's decision to affirm the
district court's dismissal of this claim. I cannot, in good conscience, join my colleagues' opinion which finds no constitutional violation in requiring Doe to wear a relatively large box
as a symbol of his crime for all to see. The Surveillance Act,
particularly the satellite-based monitoring program, as applied to Doe, is punishment, excessive, and indeed, the modern
day "scarletletter." I vigorously dissent."'

There is a combination here of strong personal feeling about what
is being imposed, along with an ordinary judicial concern for legal
error in the application of punitive measures in a scenario in
which punitive measures are not permitted.1"' This is all the more
noteworthy given the fact that there were some grounds on which
the judge did agree with the majority. This shows a very strong
commitment to the institutional conscientious obligation to get the
law right, which works in combination with a personal conscientious view of the reality of the requirement in question here.

164. Abram v. Gerry, 672 F.3d 45, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2012) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
165. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1008-09 (6th Cir. 2007) (Keith, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
166. Id.
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Lack of Specific Authority or Limits

It makes common sense that institutional and personal conscience can become intertwined in this way, and yet in all these
examples, there is still little indication of any specific authority for
resort to personal conscience, or any official idea of the limitations
on the role it may play in judicial reasoning. Judge Gould addressed one view on this question in commenting on the purpose of
writing dissenting opinions, in a case about the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act."' Spurred on by his misgiving about the interpretation and application of the law in light of a quite sympathetic
plaintiff, writing in dissent, he explained:
One might ask, when there is such a firm supermajority for a
position, what is the value of a dissent? The answer is that I
pen this dissent to explain my views, because a dissent is a
matter of individual judicial statement and individual judi-

cial conscience. The majority's opinion is reasonable, even
persuasive, but only within the limits it sets by invoking the
plain-meaning rule. If the language was as plain to me as the
majority perceives it to be, I would adopt a similar view and
shrug off a concern that Congress has blundered. However, I
view the language as ambiguous and I view traditional modes
of statutory interpretation as pointing in a different direction,
for the reasons that follow. These views may be considered by
the bench of another court, by the interested bar, or by other
interested persons.'
There are no easy answers to questions about the exact definition of judicial conscience, or the propriety of its use or placement
in opinions of federal appellate judges, but at this point we have
seen the broad span of positions taken in practice. We turn next
to a more overarching assessment of what the actual practice of
judges shows about the value and the legitimacy of references to
judicial conscience, either institutional or personal, and how that
fits into the ethics of the judicial role.

167. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1038 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (Gould, J.,
dissenting)
168. Id. (emphasis added).
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VI. LEGITIMACY OF VARIOUS USES AND PLACEMENTS

A.

Conscience in the Context of Core Commitments of the
JudicialRole

This examination of expressions of judicial conscience in federal
appellate opinions as they occur in actual judicial practice shows
that most such expressions refer to some idea of the conscience of
the court as an institution. The special perspective of the bench
allows judges to bring into the decision-making process certain
considerations that draw on the broader practical and ethical responsibilities of the role. The core commitments of the judicial
role as a trusteeship of the law-fidelity to legal (especially constitutional) authority, impartiality, independence, accountability,
and practical wisdom-are expressed in these instances as matters of "conscience," in the judges' own terms. The use of the word
"conscience" seems to be intended in these instances to underscore
the seriousness or weight of the consideration-the feeling of professional responsibility that compels the judge to make a particular decision. There is added value here in the potential for better
understanding of both the judicial role and the law itself, so these
expressions should be encouraged. They may be perfectly appropriate in any type of opinion, whether majority, concurrence, or
dissent. The best placement will be dependent on the context of
each case.
While expressions of institutional conscience are appropriate
and valuable in any type of opinion, there are different rhetorical
forces and effects to be achieved in different placements. Reference
to the influence of institutional conscience in a majority opinion
has the advantages of showing a consensus view of the judicial
role and showing concern for fulfillment of the obligations of the
role. When properly expressed, it should enhance both understanding of and confidence in the professional integrity of the judiciary.
In a concurring opinion, there is still a certain amount of consensus with the majority, and the expression of conscience is still
a demonstration of concern for and commitment to the institution
itself. The main difference is that writing separately may be an
effective way to draw more attention to the conscientious aspect of
the decision the court is making. What might have been buried or
might have seemed less remarkable in the context of other reasoning in a majority opinion can be especially highlighted in a sepa-
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rate opinion, which will likely get a reader's attention at least to
see what it concerns.
A dissent can be effective, like a concurrence, simply in getting
attention on the issue, by virtue of being separate and indicating
some disagreement with the majority. A reader will not likely
skip it. However, a dissent shows a deeper level of disagreement
than a concurrence, and thus while they may be perfectly correct,
they may come at some cost to a unified appearance of the judiciary, which may bring with it further costs for public confidence.1"'
That said, a disagreement that is openly discussed in opinions
should be a good thing, insofar as it indicates a robust argument.
It enhances (or at least should do so) the quality of the reasoning
relied on in the decision-making process. The transparency about
the disagreement, especially to the extent that it reveals something about the meaning and the role of the institutional conscience of the judiciary, is valuable. 0 If there is some mention of
judicial conscience in a separate opinion, especially if it is in a dissent, it is exceedingly helpful when the writers of majority opinions respond to that in some way to indicate their own view of the
conscientious fulfillment of institutional obligations in the analysis of the case, or to say how personal conscience should or should
not factor into the decision. Such dialogue is most helpful in getting to the bottom of judicial perspectives on the meaning and the
role of judicial conscience.
B.

Problems with Expressions of PersonalConscience

When it comes to expressions of personal conscience, things are
somewhat more complex. Where expressions of personal conscience are intertwined with institutional conscience, it may be a
perfectly good thing, insofar as it shows a significant level of personal devotion to the role. However, it remains fairly unclear
where the line is drawn between the personal and the institutional in some cases, and it is certainly unclear what if any limits
there are on how personal conscience may factor in. Some judges
do mention it, and there is no clear indication from the opinions
169. See, e.g., William A. Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17 GREEN BAG 690, 696 (1905)
("Of the many injurious aspects of the Dissenting Opinion, one of the most destructive is
that by emphasizing the personal composition of courts it is subversive of their great anonymous authority. The more impersonal their character, the more willing is the respect they
earn.").
170. See, e.g., Stanley H. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 926-27
(1962) (arguing that dissent is preferable to false unanimity).
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about any legal prohibition on it, so we have to take these expressions to be a part of the picture of the judicial role, albeit an unsettled part. Where a judge allows the personal commitments to
come in, but recognizes that the personal is trumped by the obligation to follow the law, there may be a happy balance of sorts. This
may not be a balance that falls assuredly within the proper
bounds of the role, but the balance is arguably a no-harm, no-foul
resolution that may be helpful to public confidence in and understanding of the role, to allow these sorts of escape valves for serious clashes between personal and professional integrity."'
However, expression of personal conscience to trump the conscientious obligations to the institution in a dissenting opinion is definitely problematic. There the personal obligation of the judge is
permitted to trump the professional obligation not just as a matter
of expression, but as a matter of action. The judge in these situations declines to follow the law. It is not a no-harm, no-foul scenario just because the others on the panel followed the law. Even
the rhetoric of dissent is enough to convey the idea that it is proper for judges to subvert the law, to prefer their own idea of "right"
or "justice" rather than the law as it stands. This undermines the
judicial ideal of impartiality.' More practically, it suggests that
if another judge on the panel had happened to take the same view
of adherence to his or her own personal conscientious commitments, the result would have been different and blatantly extralegal. This would be an abdication of the role, despite other available approaches that might help a judge resolve the dissonance
without harm to the corpus of the law."7 a The escape valve idea
that may be appropriate in a concurrence will not withstand scrutiny here, even for rhetorical effect in the most dramatic case. It
says "I will not follow the law" which is only proper for someone
who is not charged specifically with applying the law. It says "I
171. Though he does not provide any authority for the proposition, one author specifically suggests the use of concurring and dissenting opinions as appropriate platforms for expression of a judge's convictions. Moorhead, supra note 10, at 822 ("[Als a matter of morals
and good conscience, such opinions enable their authors to express their convictions in lieu
of silently assenting to a majority opinion in which they do not believe.").
172. Another word that might be used in place of 'impartiality' in this sense might be
'objectivity.' The dimensions of the meaning of that word, though, are well beyond the
scope of this article. For an extensive account of the relationship between objectivity and
legal decision-making, see MATTHEW H. KRAMER, OBJECTITY AND THE RULE OF LAW

(2007). See also FISS, supra note 58, at 149-71 (discussing objectivity and interpretation).
173. Here Professor Brand-Ballard, for instance, would disagree, though using the specific language of morality, rather than "conscience" specifically. See BRAND-BALLARD, supra note 16, passim.
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will (or at any rate, I would if I could) use my power as a judge to
impose the law as I wish it were." Such partiality for the judge's
own view of what is right will only undermine confidence in the
impartiality of judicial decision-making.17 4
Judges must be mindful about the extent to which their expression of personal commitments may suggest to the public that the
outcome of a given case may be different according to the personal
commitments of the judge assigned. Such individualism does not
exemplify the kind of independence that ought to be upheld as the
judicial ideal. There may be power (in practice) to rely on personal
conscientious commitments over against legal or other institutional commitments, but there is no proper authority to do so.17
Dissenting on grounds of personal conscience without officially
publishing the opinion does not solve or avoid the problem. The
reality of unpublished opinions is that they are still readily available, and even if they cannot be officially cited back to the court
with the weight of authority, they indicate arguments that could
be made to the court and might well be persuasive, even if the
case itself is not cited. Nor is the solution to dissent on the basis
of commitment to personal conscience without writing that in an
opinion at all. Judges, as trustees, are obliged to account for their
management of the corpus of the law by explaining the reasoning
that stands behind a decision to dissent.
So often, the truest clashes of personal and professional conscience come about as a result of a judge's deep-seated desire to
see justice done. Where it seems to a judge that the law produces
174. Writing about Supreme Court justices making decisions on matters of Constitutional Law, Professor Powell emphasized that the legitimacy of these decisions depend on
the perception that the justices are playing by the rules. POWELL, supra note 1, at 42-43.
That said, he also asserts that in such cases there is always a correct (i.e., yes or no) answer, no matter how close the case. Id. at 44. This second point may be less true in the
broad sweep of decisions covered by the judges who are the focus of this article. In any
event, the idea that judges can unilaterally exempt themselves from the rules of the game
(i.e., following established law) when it offends their individual consciences is at the very
least problematic for public confidence. For further discussion of the jurisprudence of following the rules, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991) and DWORKIN,

supra note 148, passim.
175. It is worth remembering at this point, however, that there are other practical options for a judge who feels truly stuck, as a matter of personal and professional integrity,
between an obligation to a faithfully apply law and fidelity to his personal conscience. A
judge may recuse; may mention the difficulty in a concurring opinion (thus showing deference, within the role, to the legal authority); or if the situation is more extreme and the
judge feels so compelled, the judge may even resign his or her position in order to give free
rein to his or her own conscience and preserve his or her own sense of integrity.
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unjust results, judicial conscience (both institutional and personal)
may prompt the judge to draw attention to problems that may not
have been seen or anticipated by lawmakers in the first instance.
This can be a quite proper fulfillment of the judge's professional
trusteeship obligations. Whether it is legitimate as such will depend on the circumstances and explanation of that matter of conscience and the role the judge is playing in expressing it. The
more the judge raises the issue to make sure it is clearly understood and thus can be properly considered by those with legislative or interpretive authority, the more likely it is to be safely
within the proper bounds of the judicial role. By contrast, the
more the judge not only raises the issue but feels compelled to act
on the conscientious disagreement by refusing to apply the law as
it stands, the further the expression lies outside the bounds of judicial propriety, elevating adherence to personal conscience above
institutional conscience.
While one would never define the judicial role as one in which
personal commitments of the role occupants are intended explicitly to take precedence over professional commitments, there may
be a certain tolerance in actual practice for an occasional release
of personal steam by judges, in recognition that the role is a demanding and difficult one. An escape valve is recognized as sometimes necessary where it does not impede or interfere with the
ultimate application of the law. There are advantages to a certain
flexibility along these lines. First, these occasional, and often very
human, responses to what the judge perceives as an injustice
worked by the law as interpreted and applied by the majority, may
allow the public to see that that judges consider cases very carefully, and that while their role is not ordinarily one that resorts to
personal considerations, they are human beings, and cannot always turn a blind eye to their personal commitments, which may
well be personal commitments of members of the public, and
which in any event have not (by virtue of being placed in a concurrence) interfered with the application of the law. Second, these
expressions may indicate to potential future occupants of the judicial role that there may be in rare instances a way out of a spot
that creates difficulties for personal integrity, which may encourage some to pursue a judicial career who would otherwise have
been deterred by the prospect of being absolutely stuck in a situation in which they might feel compelled to speak up as to personal
commitments. Third, they signal to the legislature what may be
unintended consequences of a particular law, and open the possi-

Winter 2013

In Good Conscience

163

bility of further legislative consideration of making a change to the
law. 176
For any of these good effects to arise, transparency about what
is going on is of course essential. The judge must be straightforward about the role played by the personal commitments in the
consideration of the case. And for these good effects to provide the
underpinnings of the legitimacy of the practice, the practice must
be truly rare for any given judge. The incorporation of, and indeed
the reliance on, personal commitments, as opposed to straightforward application of the law alone, may well remain unexpressed
in many cases. However, in those cases, the other reasons actually expressed in a given opinion, will be able to be judged as legitimate or not on their own terms, so that the personal commitment
will not in those instances have overridden a legitimate basis for a
decision.
The line between institutional conscience and personal conscience is not always easy to draw, and there is even less clarity
about the authority of judges openly to incorporate personal conscience into the decision-making process. However, as long as
judges do resort to personal conscience (and the expressions we
can identify indicate that it does happen, and the lack of explicit
authority to do so suggests that it may happen more often than it
is openly expressed), the transparency offered by open expression
of personal conscience is better than hiding it. One might argue
that the public will have more confidence in the judiciary if judicial personalities do not show. But hiding certain aspects of judicial decision-making, whether because they are not allowed or because it is unclear whether they are allowed, holds us back from a
full understanding of what goes on in the judicial role, and thus
prevents us from engaging in the best regulation of that role.
Wherever conscience is expressed as a matter of fulfillment of
the responsibilities of the role, value is added to our understanding. Evading questions about the responsibilities of the role with
regard to personal conscientious commitments, by contrast, comes
176. Alerting a higher court or legislative body to the need to amend or change the law,
whether that is aimed at a simple correction of language or a wholesale changing of the
legislative mind to "get the law right," is more legitimate the more it arises from an institutional perspective and concern, and less legitimate the more it arises from a purely personal commitment. But acting without authority to make the correction, despite accompanying expressions of a desire to "do justice," only undermines the authority and legitimacy of
the judicial role. Whatever rhetorical emphasis is gained by doing this sort of thing in a
dissenting opinion is just as surely lost in terms of respect for credibility and restraint
expected of the judiciary.
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at a cost. Judges, as trustees of the law, are accountable for the
reasoning underlying their decisions. Omitting expressions of personal conscience, without first clarifying explicitly what counts as
personal (as opposed to institutional) conscience, what the limits
are on its legitimate use in the decision-making process, and what
the authority is for all of that, does not resolve the issues. Instead, it keeps observers of the judiciary from understanding what
role personal conscience might properly play. If, with transparency and with time, it becomes clear that personal conscience has no
role to play, that will work itself out. As Judge Cardozo wisely
said:
The flaws are there as in every human institution. Because
they are not only there but visible, we have faith that they
will be corrected. There is no assurance that the rule of the
majority will be the expression of perfect reason when embodied in constitution or in statute. We ought not to expect more
of it when embodied in the judgments of the courts. The tide
rises and falls, but the sands of error crumble.

. .

. Ever in the

making, as law develops through the centuries, is this new
faith which silently and steadily effaces our mistakes and eccentricities. I sometimes think that we worry ourselves overmuch about the enduring consequences of our errors. They
may work a little confusion for a time. In the end, they will be
modified or corrected or their teachings ignored. The future
takes care of such things. In the endless process of testing and
retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross, and a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound and fine.'
We can only aspire to this perfection of the law over time, though,
if we persist in asking the hard questions and carefully examining
what really goes on in judicial practice and why.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Despite a lack of perfect clarity or consistency among federal
appellate judicial views on the meaning of or the propriety of reference to or reliance on judicial conscience, these expressions do
come into play. Most of the expressions of conscience examined in
this article, even when expressed in terms of a first-person perspective, and even though they may be a matter of personal com177.

BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 177, 179 (1921).
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mitment (to the role), are nonetheless expressions of institutional
responsibility.
Therefore, they are perfectly appropriate in any
opinion -majority, concurrence, or dissent. These can be useful
expressions in that they demonstrate to the public the careful consideration of judges not only of the cases and questions before
them, but of the special role they play, and the seriousness with
which they play the role. This can legitimately boost a proper and
meaningful public confidence in the judiciary. Where expressions
of personal conscience are concerned, as discussed in the previous
section, many significant questions about the legitimacy of the use
and expression of individual conscientious commitment remain
unanswered. These are questions that must be more deeply and
openly explored by those who occupy the judicial role, in order
that we may reach a better understanding of that role in all its
fullness.
This article has looked only at federal appellate judges, who
have arguably less at stake than elected judges in their opinions
when it comes to public approval or job security, and who have
arguably more room for the expression of conscience in the context
of judging in panels, when compared with those who judge alone.
There are significant questions that would be all the more complex
when it comes to judges who must seek re-election or reappointment, who must make more factual determinations, and so
on. 7 ' This article has merely laid some of the groundwork by establishing rough categories for analysis and acknowledging the
lack of definition and authority on any aspect of the questions at
stake when it comes to judicial conscience. In short, it opens a
conversation about judicial conscience. Many more issues must be
explored, both in the federal appellate context and in other judicial contexts.'
Judges and scholars alike must continue to contribute to the effort to reach a better understanding of these issues, and thus a fuller understanding of the judicial role.
178. For example, should the public or the executive branch choose judges on the basis of
their personal commitments, or should or could those personal commitments remain irrelevant in the selection and retention processes? These questions are well beyond the scope of
this article, but are essential questions to resolve for the better understanding and better
practice of the selection and retention processes currently employed.
179. For example, if expressions of personal conscience are not legitimate, but are tolerated in the appellate context for the occasional release of steam without actual disruption
of the application of law, in separate opinions, will this act as the thin end of the wedge,
encouraging a view that personal views are legitimate, and changing practice over time?
By contrast, if expressions of personal conscience are legitimate, what efforts ought lawyers
to devote to making explicit appeals to judicial conscience in order to subvert the substantive law?

